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De- and Re-constructing Public 
Governance for Biodiversity 
Conservation 
Alejandro E. Camacho* 
To argue that the current extinction event could be averted 
if people just cared more and were willing to make more 
sacrifices is not wrong, exactly; still, it misses the point. It 
doesn’t much matter whether people care or don’t care. 
What matters is that people change the world. 
—Elizabeth Kolbert1 
 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 1586 
I.   THE WICKEDNESS OF BIODIVERSITY LOSS ......................... 1591 
A.  Biodiversity Loss as a Wicked Problem ................. 1591 
B.  Managing Wickedness ........................................... 1594 
II.   THE GOALS AND TOOLS OF PUBLIC BIODIVERSITY 
GOVERNANCE .................................................................... 1596 
A.  Regulate Development Causing Future 
Biodiversity Loss .................................................... 1596 
B.  Reserving, Preserving, and/or Restoring Land ..... 1600 
 
 * Chancellor’s Professor of Law and Faculty Director, Center for Land, Environment, and 
Natural Resources, University of California, Irvine School of Law; Member Scholar, Center for 
Progressive Reform. I thank J.B. Ruhl, Jim Salzman, and the participants of the 2019 Vanderbilt 
Law Review Symposium for their constructive comments; Alex Dashman and Katie Raitz for their 
valuable research assistance; and the Vanderbilt Law Review for its editorial support. This article 
is written in honor of the memory of John Copeland Nagle (1960–2019) and attempts to channel 
his empathy for future generations, hopefulness, and pragmatism. 
 1.  ELIZABETH KOLBERT, THE SIXTH EXTINCTION: AN UNNATURAL HISTORY 266 (2014). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Is biodiversity loss wicked? What has been done about it? And 
how might public governance be altered to improve the prognosis? A 
substantial and growing number of scholars have sought to define and 
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characterize incredibly complex social problems, alternatively labelled 
as “messes,”2 “swamp[s],”3 “massive,”4 “wicked,”5 or even “super  
wicked” problems.6 
Biodiversity loss, or the decline in variation among genes, 
species, and functional traits in a particular area,7 has been 
characterized by some as a classic wicked problem.8 Scientists agree on 
an ongoing biodiversity crisis worldwide.9 Though the focus is often on 
species extinction risk,10 other indicators of biodiversity, including 
ecosystem extent and condition, biotic integrity, and total biomass, have 
all deteriorated sharply from the prehistorical baseline.11 Other major 
dangers include the rising losses in genetic diversity within species 
(reducing resilience to the effects of climate change due to fewer 
potential favorable adaptations),12 functional diversity (or the presence 
of multiple species that fulfill similar roles in an ecosystem), and overall 
ecosystem function (or the benefits or services that an ecosystem 
provides).13 The challenges in defining the problem and potential 
 
 2. Russell L. Ackoff, The Art and Science of Mess Management, 11 INTERFACES 20, 22 (1981). 
 3. DONALD A. SCHÖN, EDUCATING THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: TOWARD A NEW DESIGN 
FOR TEACHING AND LEARNING IN THE PROFESSIONS 3 (1987). 
 4.  See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive 
Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 64 (2010). 
 5.  See, e.g., Horst W.J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of 
Planning, 4 POL’Y SCIS. 155, 160–61 (1973). 
 6.  See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining 
the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1160 (2009). 
 7.  Bradley J. Cardinale, J. Emmett Duffy, Andrew Gonzalez, David U. Hooper, Charles 
Perrings, Patrick Venail, Anita Narwani, Georgina M. Mace, David Tilman, David A. Wardle, Ann 
P. Kinzig, Gretchen C. Daily, Michel Loreau, James B. Grace, Anne Larigauderie, Diane S. 
Srivastava & Shahid Naeem, Biodiversity Loss and Its Impact on Humanity, 486 NATURE 59, 60 
(2012). Biodiversity loss thus includes species extinction but more broadly consists of any decline 
from the genetic to the ecological scale. See id.; see also infra Section V.A. 
 8.  See, e.g., Martin Sharman & Musa C. Mlambo, Wicked: The Problem of Biodiversity Loss, 
21 GAIA 274, 274 (2012). 
 9.  See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL SCI.-POL’Y PLATFORM ON BIODIVERSITY & ECOSYSTEM 
SERVS., SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS OF THE IPBES GLOBAL ASSESSMENT REPORT ON 
BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM SERVICES 10–12 (2019) [hereinafter IPBES SUMMARY]. 
 10.  See id. at 24 (reporting that approximately 12.5 percent of all species worldwide are 
threatened with extinction). 
 11.  See id. at 25 (reporting that ecosystem extent and condition has declined by forty-seven 
percent on average, biotic integrity in terrestrial communities by twenty-three percent, and global 
biomass of wild mammals by eighty-two percent). 
 12.  See id. at 25–26 (reporting that “[t]en per[ ]cent of domesticated breeds of mammals were 
recorded as extinct,” and genetic diversity in wild species worldwide has declined an average of 
one percent per decade since the mid-nineteenth century); see also M. Bálint, S. Domisch, C.H.M. 
Engelhardt, P. Haase, S. Lehrian, J. Sauer, K. Theissinger, S.U. Pauls & C. Nowak, Cryptic 
Biodiversity Loss Linked to Global Climate Change, 1 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 313, 317 (2011). 
 13.  See IPBES SUMMARY, supra note 9, at 22 (discussing the fact that the “deterioration of 
nature and consequent disruption of benefits to people has both direct and indirect implications” 
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solutions, the multiplicity and interconnectivity of drivers and 
consequences, as well as other features of biodiversity loss have led 
scholars to consider it wicked and even super wicked.14 
A more useful question, however, might be how much does the 
wicked label matter. Some criticize the wicked problem nomenclature 
as merely a rhetorical turn: an increasingly, and perhaps 
indiscriminately, used shorthand for identifying very complicated, and 
perhaps even intractable, problems.15 Indeed, a wicked label is likely 
only relevant if such a designation helps formulate approaches for 
addressing the problem. 
Perhaps the essential inquiry, then, is what can be done to 
manage the dilemma. Some do consider the wicked problem tag to be 
valuable for identifying effective responses,16 including for managing 
biodiversity loss.17 Undoubtedly, proposals for untangling wicked 
problems abound. Virtually all of these proposals, however, focus on the 
procedural facets of public governance, with a procession of scholars 
offering ways to improve decisionmaking processes to rein in  
wicked problems.18 
While some attention to process may be warranted, managing 
complex problems like biodiversity loss also requires consideration of 
other core elements of governance. Governance can best be understood 
as having substantive, procedural, and structural facets.19 As Professor 
 
for various aspects of society); see also Jae R. Pasari, Taal Levi, Erika S. Zavaleta & David Tilman, 
Several Scales of Biodiversity Affect Ecosystem Multifunctionality, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 
10219, 10219 (2013). 
 14.  See infra Section I.A. 
 15.  See, e.g., Nick Turnbull & Robert Hoppe, Problematizing ‘Wickedness’: A Critique of the 
Wicked Problems Concept, from Philosophy to Practice, 38 POL’Y & SOC’Y 315, 316 (2019) 
(describing “rhetorical appeal” of wicked terminology “as when used by practitioners to avoid 
blame for policy failure, or to draw attention and resources to certain problems”); id. at 333; B. 
Guy Peters, What Is So Wicked About Wicked Problems? A Conceptual Analysis and a Research 
Program, 36 POL’Y & SOC’Y 385, 386 (2017) (“[D]escribing [difficult] policy problems as wicked 
problems has become a fad in the academic literature.”); John Alford & Brian W. Head, Wicked 
and Less Wicked Problems: A Typology and a Contingency Framework, 36 POL’Y & SOC’Y 397, 398 
(2017) (“[T]he term ‘wicked problem’ has become inflated and over-used.”). 
 16.  See, e.g., Catrien J.A.M. Termeer, Art Dewulf & Robbert Biesbroek, A Critical 
Assessment of the Wicked Problem Concept: Relevance and Usefulness for Policy Science and 
Practice, 38 POL’Y & SOC’Y 167, 176 (2019) (“[T]he concept of wicked problems has important 
rhetorical effects in research and practice.”). 
 17.  See, e.g., Sharman & Mlambo, supra note 8, at 274 (“[I]t is crucial to understand 
biodiversity loss as a wicked problem[ ] in order to facilitate innovative and comprehensive 
approaches to dealing with it.”). 
 18.  See infra Section I.B. 
 19.  See Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert L. Glicksman, Legal Adaptive Capacity: How 
Program Goals and Processes Shape Federal Land Adaptation to Climate Change, 87 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 711, 724–34 (2016) [hereinafter Legal Adaptive Capacity] (defining the substantive and 
procedural components of legal adaptive capacity); ALEJANDRO E. CAMACHO & ROBERT L. 
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J.B. Ruhl has noted, it is “important to distinguish between the 
resilience of the legal system’s underlying structure and processes and 
the stability of the substantive content of law.”20 Each of these facets 
affects the legal system’s adaptive capacity to manage complexity and 
uncertainty—in other words, to cope with wickedness. Policymakers 
might more effectively tackle wicked problems like biodiversity loss by 
reconstructing public governance to enhance not only procedural but 
also substantive and structural legal adaptive capacity. 
This Article deconstructs the substantive, procedural, and 
structural components of public governance in the United States to 
explain how the existing legal infrastructure lacks the legal adaptive 
capacity to manage the wickedness of biodiversity loss. That is, 
particularly in the context of global anthropogenic climate change, the 
substantive goals and tools of public action, the processes used by 
governmental institutions to advance such goals and implement such 
tools, and the structure of allocated authority among public institutions 
have been devised in ways that make biodiversity loss virtually 
impossible to tackle meaningfully. 
First, the substantive goals of natural resources law are not 
primarily directed at promoting biodiversity or broader notions of 
ecological health.21 Indeed, the range of tools conventionally employed 
for achieving such regulatory goals are primarily directed at one of 
several objectives that, at best, have only indirectly been aimed at 
promoting some version of biodiversity: minimizing direct human harm 
or other interventions, maintaining historical conditions, or 
maximizing resource yield. The few more recent interventions that are 
better directed at promoting ecological health remain rare and 
inadequate. As a result, it would be misleading to state that we have 
even attempted to address the biodiversity crisis through governance in 
any meaningful way. 
Second, public biodiversity governance lacks procedural legal 
adaptive capacity. The conventional regulatory and management 
processes adopted for advancing prevailing natural resource goals and 
for deciding when and how to employ such strategies are insufficiently 
tethered to managing both the uncertainties and the dynamics 
accompanying ecological phenomena.22 Significant opportunities 
 
GLICKSMAN, REORGANIZING GOVERNMENT: A FUNCTIONAL AND DIMENSIONAL FRAMEWORK  
236–37 (2019) [hereinafter REORGANIZING GOVERNMENT] (distinguishing structural legal  
adaptive capacity).  
 20.  J.B. Ruhl, General Design Principles for Resilience and Adaptive Capacity in Legal 
Systems—with Applications to Climate Change Adaptation, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1373, 1383 (2011).  
 21.  See infra Part II. 
 22.  See infra Part III. 
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remain for adapting biodiversity governance to be better directed at 
promoting learning, reducing uncertainty, and adjusting strategies as 
ecological conditions shift and managers gain information. 
Third, the configuration of authority among institutional actors 
charged with implementing natural resources law remains 
underexplored and deficient.23 There has been insufficient attention 
directed at parsing and adjusting the structure of governance. 
Unfortunately, authority over natural resources management and 
regulation has remained largely fragmented into many decentralized, 
overlapping, and poorly coordinated institutions. Tailored alterations to 
the allocation of authority over natural resources can leverage key 
advantages of centralized and/or coordinated institutions while 
maintaining the largely decentralized, independent, and overlapping 
character of public biodiversity governance. 
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I briefly describes how 
addressing biodiversity loss is a particularly complex challenge—part 
of a super wicked crisis, in light of global anthropogenic climate 
change.24 Unfortunately, the wicked problems literature provides only 
limited help for assessing existing governance or envisioning 
alternatives more attuned to the problem. 
Accordingly, the Article focuses on how conservation laws have 
been designed in ways that make biodiversity loss impossible to 
address. It does so by deconstructing public governance—separating 
out substantive regulatory goals and strategies from its processes and 
the structural allocation of regulatory authority. The focus is the United 
States, though other regimes are likely subject to similar deficiencies.25 
Part II considers how, particularly in the context of global 
anthropogenic climate change, U.S. natural resources governance has 
lacked the substantive legal adaptive capacity to meaningfully manage 
biodiversity loss. Part III details the limitations of public biodiversity 
governance processes. Part IV explores the inadequacy of the existing 
configuration of authority among the primary public institutions 
charged with managing ecological resources. Finally, Part V offers a 
preliminary reconstruction of public biodiversity governance, 
explaining how the United States might reframe public institutions to 
better address biodiversity loss.26 
 
 23.  See infra Part IV. 
 24.  See infra Part I. 
 25.  See, e.g., Alejandro E. Camacho, Managing Ecosystem Effects in an Era of Rapid Climate 
Change, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, VOL. 1: CLIMATE CHANGE LAW 555, 
558 (Michael Faure ed., 2016) (describing the limited adaptive capacity of governance in the United 
States and European Union to manage climate change’s ecological effects). 
 26.  See infra Part V. 
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I. THE WICKEDNESS OF BIODIVERSITY LOSS 
A. Biodiversity Loss as a Wicked Problem 
Biodiversity loss appears to be particularly wicked. The seminal 
articulation of “wicked problems” offered ten characteristics, though the 
last is idiosyncratic to the urban planning context: (1) no definitive 
formulation; (2) no stopping rule; (3) solutions are not true-or-false, but 
good-or-bad; (4) no immediate and ultimate test of solutions; (5) 
solutions are “one-shot operations”; (6) innumerable potential solutions; 
(7) uniqueness; (8) problem is symptomatic of other problem(s); (9) 
discrepancies in representing, explaining, and thus solving the 
problem; and (10) planners are responsible for the consequences of their 
actions.27 Subsequent scholarship has generalized and distilled these 
components, though not often in consistent ways.28 Some added the 
more selective category of “super wicked problems,” for which also “time 
is running out; those who cause the problem also seek to provide a 
solution; the central authority needed to address them is weak or non-
existent; and irrational discounting occurs that pushes responses into 
the future.”29 Meanwhile, Professors Ruhl and Salzman categorize 
“massive” problems based on the attributes of causal sources, causal 
mechanisms, and cumulative effects.30 
Analysis of these criteria suggests that biodiversity loss likely 
qualifies as a wicked, perhaps a super wicked, problem. A number of 
commenters, albeit with limited explanation, have concluded as such, 
particularly in conjunction with global anthropogenic climate change.31 
As stated by one scholar, 
[T]hreats to global biodiversity, against the approaching beat of a changing climate[,] . . . 
have created a set of “wicked problems,” that are messy, intractable, subject to multiple 
 
 27.  Rittel & Webber, supra note 5, at 161–67.  
 28.  One literature synthesis states wicked problems are (1) indefinable, (2) ambiguous and 
interconnected, (3) temporally challenging, (4) repercussive, (5) doubly hermeneutic, and (6) 
morally consequential. D. Duckett, D. Feliciano, J. Martin-Ortega & J. Munoz-Rojas, Tackling 
Wicked Environmental Problems: The Discourse and Its Influence on Praxis in Scotland, 154 
LANDSCAPE & URB. PLAN. 44, 45 (2016). Others emphasize dimensions of complexity, uncertainty, 
and divergence. Brian W. Head, Wicked Problems in Public Policy, 3 PUB. POL’Y 101, 103 (2008). 
Several focus on features of cross-disciplinarity and need for collaboration. See, e.g., Sandra A. 
Waddock, Educating Holistic Professionals in a World of Wicked Problems, 2 APPLIED 
DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 40, 43 (1998). 
 29.  Kelly Levin, Benjamin Cashore, Steven Bernstein & Graeme Auld, Overcoming the 
Tragedy of Super Wicked Problems: Constraining Our Future Selves to Ameliorate Global Climate 
Change, 45 POL’Y SCIS. 123, 124 (2012). 
 30.  Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 4, at 73. 
 31.  See, e.g., Catherine Allan, Can Adaptive Management Help Us Embrace the Murray-
Darling Basin’s Wicked Problems?, in ADAPTIVE AND INTEGRATED WATER MANAGEMENT: COPING 
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interpretations, and for which solutions at present are not evident or inscrutable. Dealing 
with the causes and consequences of biodiversity loss in a changing environment is one 
such problem.32 
The relevant classic factors suggest a strong case for global and 
local biodiversity loss as wicked. Biodiversity, and its consequent loss, 
is well recognized as a challenging concept to formulate.33 The causal 
chains linking different ecosystem components are complex, dynamic, 
nonlinear, and unpredictable.34 Promoting biodiversity conservation is 
a normative proposition.35 Though there likely are many possible 
strategies for combatting biodiversity loss, a definitive criterion for 
demonstrating success is illusive.36 Both the study and implementation 
of strategies for reducing biodiversity loss can influence and alter the 
problem.37 There are countless possible, contestable social responses for 
reducing or restoring biodiversity, particularly as influenced by climate 
change.38 The particular risk of irreversibility makes biodiversity loss 
distinctive,39 and biodiversity loss is certainly symptomatic of deeper 
problems, including climate change40 and unsustainable development.41 
Finally, failures to address biodiversity loss are subject to “widely 
divergent explanations.”42 
 
WITH COMPLEXITY AND UNCERTAINTY 61, 64 (Claudia Pahl-Wostl, Pavel Kabat & Jörn Möltgen 
eds., 2008); Ruth DeFries & Harini Nagendra, Ecosystem Management as a Wicked Problem, 356 
SCIENCE 265, 266 (2017). 
 32.  Kent H. Redford, William Adams & Georgina M. Mace, Synthetic Biology and 
Conservation of Nature: Wicked Problems and Wicked Solutions, PLOS BIOLOGY, vol. 11, Apr. 2013, 
at 1, 1. 
 33.  See Sharman & Mlambo, supra note 8, at 275 (“ ‘Biodiversity’ is notoriously difficult to 
define, and the differences are often significant.”); Daniel P. Faith, Biodiversity, STAN. ENCYC. 
PHIL. (Jun. 11, 2003), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/biodiversity/ [https://perma.cc/9N7C-
BFJW] (examining the varied and often conflicting ways in which scholars define “biodiversity”); 
see also infra notes 277–287 and accompanying text. 
 34.  DeFries & Nagendra, supra note 31, at 257. 
 35.  See Paul Roebuck & Paul Phifer, The Persistence of Positivism in Conservation Biology, 
13 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 444 (1999) (arguing that biodiversity conservation is rooted primarily 
in ethics and should reverse the trend of a focus on fact verification and falsification). 
 36.  Sharman & Mlambo, supra note 8, at 275. 
 37.  Id. at 276. 
 38.  Id.; Terry L. Root, Diana Liverman & Chris Newman, Managing Biodiversity in the Light 
of Climate Change: Current Biological Effects and Future Impacts, in KEY TOPICS IN 
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 85, 100 (David W. Macdonald & Katrina Service eds., 2007). 
 39.  Faith, supra note 33.  
 40.  Root et al., supra note 38, at 85 (“[P]redicted changes in global and regional climates as 
a result of increasing atmospheric carbon dioxide have tremendous implications for species and 
habitat conservation.”); ALLISTER SLINGENBERG, LEON BRAAT, HENNY VAN DER WINDT, KOEN 
RADEMAEKERS, LISA EICHLER & KERRY TURNER, STUDY ON UNDERSTANDING THE CAUSES OF 
BIODIVERSITY LOSS AND THE POLICY ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK 54 (2009) (“Biodiversity and 
climate change are closely inter-linked, and each impacts upon the other . . . .”). 
 41.  SLINGENBERG ET AL., supra note 40, at 13. 
 42.  Sharman & Mlambo, supra note 8, at 276. 
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In fact, biodiversity loss, particularly as it is fundamentally 
linked to global climate change, meets the additional criteria of a super 
wicked problem. Time is of the essence in light of rapid declines, and no 
single authority is charged with managing the problem.43 Moreover, the 
primary perpetrators are those in the best position to address it (and 
have little incentive to do so).44 
Similarly, Ruhl and Salzman’s framework—considering the 
causal sources, causal mechanisms, and cumulative effects—suggests 
biodiversity loss, again linked to climate change, is an especially 
massive problem.45 First, the stressors that lead to biodiversity loss—
including direct stressors like human development46 and more indirect 
ones such as invasive species,47 habitat fragmentation,48 and, 
increasingly, global anthropogenic climate change49—are many, 
diverse, dispersed, and quite variable.50 Moreover, the causal 
mechanisms of biodiversity loss occur on multiple governance and 
geographic scales;51 are often latent;52 and can be complex, nonlinear, 
intertwined, and attenuated.53 Finally, the many disparate, 
 
 43.  Lazarus, supra note 6, at 1160. 
 44.  Id. at 1160–61. 
 45. See Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 4, at 73–79.  
 46.  Alexander Wood, An Emerging Consensus on Biodiversity Loss, in THE ROOT CAUSES OF 
BIODIVERSITY LOSS 1, 5 (Alexander Wood, Pamela Stedman-Edwards & Johanna Mang eds., 2000) 
(“[H]abitat alteration is clearly the predominant cause and is a problem that operates at the local 
scale.”); SLINGENBERG ET AL., supra note 40, at 13. 
 47.  Wood, supra note 46, at 5; SLINGENBERG ET AL., supra note 40, at 56. 
 48.  SLINGENBERG ET AL., supra note 40, at 13, 29. 
 49.  See Wood, supra note 46, at 5; SLINGENBERG ET AL., supra note 40, at 54. 
 50.   Sharman & Mlambo, supra note 8, at 276. 
 51.  See, e.g., J.A. Puppim de Oliveira, O. Balaban, C.N.H. Doll, R. Moreno-Peñaranda, A. 
Gasparatos, D. Iossifova & A. Suwa, Cities and Biodiversity: Perspectives and Governance 
Challenges for Implementing the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) at the City Level, 144 
BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 1302, 1303 (2011); Klaus Bosselmann, Plants and Politics: The 
International Legal Regime Concerning Biotechnology and Biodiversity, 7 COLO. J. INT’L ENV’T L. 
& POL’Y 111, 113–14 (1996); Duckett et al., supra note 28, at 44–45. 
 52.  See Mikko Kuussaari, Riccardo Bommarco, Risto K. Heikkinen, Aveliina Helm, Jochen 
Krauss, Regina Lindborg, Erik Öckinger, Meelis Pärtel, Joan Pino, Ferran Rodà, Constantí 
Stefanescu, Tiit Teder, Martin Zobel & Ingolf Steffan-Dewenter, Extinction Debt: A Challenge for 
Biodiversity Conservation, 24 TRENDS IN ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 564, 564 (2009) (highlighting “a 
notable increase in awareness of delayed extinctions, also called extinction debt, as an important 
factor to consider in biodiversity conservation”). 
 53.  See e.g., Justin Kitzes, Eric Berlow, Erin Conlisk, Karlheinz Erb, Katsunori Iha, Neo 
Martinez, Erica A. Newman, Christoph Plutzar, Adam B. Smith & John Harte, Consumption-
Based Conservation Targeting: Linking Biodiversity Loss to Upstream Demand Through a Global 
Wildlife Footprint, 10 CONSERVATION LETTERS 531, 531 (2016) (“[P]roximate causes of biodiversity 
loss, however, are themselves driven by upstream economic activities.”); Chris D. Thomas, Alison 
Cameron, Rhys E. Green, Michel Bakkenes, Linda J. Beaumont, Yvonne C. Collingham, Barend 
F.N. Erasmus, Marinez Ferreira de Siqueira, Alan Grainger, Lee Hannah, Lesley Hughes, Brian 
Huntley, Albert S. van Jaarsveld, Guy F. Midgley, Lera Miles, Miguel A. Ortega-Huerta, A. 
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incremental, and long-term effects that lead to biodiversity loss can be 
difficult to identify, measure, and reverse,54 and occur intermittently 
and sporadically.55 In fact, in light of global climate change’s pervasive 
influence on the various causes of biodiversity loss,56 it is likely part of 
the most complex archetype of massive problems identified by Ruhl and 
Salzman—the policy jungle.57 
B. Managing Wickedness 
The literature on wicked problems provides some, albeit 
incomplete, direction for designing public governance to better manage 
complex problems such as biodiversity loss. Numerous scholars have 
developed intricate proposals for addressing wicked problems through 
facilitated planning and dispute resolution—termed alternatively as an 
“issue-based information system,”58 “dialogue mapping,”59 “problem 
structuring methods,”60 “general morphological analysis,”61 “systems 
 
Townsend Peterson, Oliver L. Phillips & Stephen E. Williams, Extinction Risk from Climate 
Change, 427 NATURE 145, 147 (2004) (stating that most severe effects on biodiversity will be from 
interactions between threats to biodiversity, rather than threats like climate change “acting  
in isolation”). 
 54.  See SLINGENBERG ET AL., supra note 40, at 13 (listing the many factors that can all 
contribute to biodiversity loss). 
 55.  Id. at 56. 
 56.  Thomas et al., supra note 53, at 147. 
 57.  Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 4, at 88 (defining policy jungles as cumulative effects 
problems that combine the attributes of feedback, discontinuity, and spaghetti bowl problems). 
 58.  See, e.g., Werner Kunz & Horst W.J. Rittel, Issues as Elements of Information Systems 1 
(Inst. for Urb. & Reg’l Dev., Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Working Paper No. 131, 1970), 
https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.134.1741&rep=rep1&type=pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K73K-VDMV] (offering an “Issue-Based Information System” (IBIS) to help 
stakeholders coordinate to manage complex problems). 
 59.  See, e.g., JEFF CONKLIN, DIALOGUE MAPPING: BUILDING SHARED UNDERSTANDING OF 
WICKED PROBLEMS 19 (2005) (proposing “dialogue mapping,” based on IBIS, as a facilitated process 
for bringing stakeholders together to “generate coherence around wicked problems”). 
 60.  See, e.g., Jonathan Rosenhead, What’s the Problem? An Introduction to Problem 
Structuring Methods, 26 INTERFACES 117, 119 (1996) (suggesting a group problem-solving process 
that integrates multiple perspectives, transparency, and relationship building). 
 61.  See, e.g., Tom Ritchey, Wicked Problems: Modelling Social Messes with Morphological 
Analysis, 2 ACTA MORPHOLOGICA GENERALIS 1, 5–6 (2013) (proposing a group-facilitated and 
iterative “General Morphological Analysis” problem-solving process “attuned to the methodological 
issues of wicked problems”). 
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thinking” and “agile methodology,”62 or “mess mapping.”63 Though often 
short on how they might apply in different contexts, these generalizable 
frameworks focus on outlining templates for tackling complexity 
through intricate problem-solving processes. An overlapping literature 
originating in the ecological sciences has developed and studied how 
adaptive management and resilience theory can help managers better 
understand and tackle socio-ecological problems.64 
Both of these literatures thus largely focus on the procedural 
aspect of governance, and as important as that component might be, it 
is not everything. Only a few wicked problems scholars explore 
institutional or structural mechanisms, and even then they are 
typically fused with procedural strategies.65 Similarly, although the 
more robust adaptive management literature provides a useful 
framework for assessing and adjusting governance to manage 
uncertainties in decisionmaking, adaptive management largely 
emphasizes procedural and, to a much more limited extent, structural 
features of governance for managing complexity and change.66 In short, 
the wicked tag, to date, has provided incomplete guidance for assessing 
and adjusting governance. 
A more comprehensive review of not only the procedural but also 
the substantive and structural aspects of public governance is needed 
to get a complete picture of how well governmental institutions have 
been devised to manage wicked problems. As further detailed in Parts 
II, III, and IV, the substantive goals and strategies, processes, and 
structure of public biodiversity governance are each not well designed 
to either tackle biodiversity loss or manage change. Unfortunately, this 
 
 62.  See, e.g., Euphemia Wong, What Is a Wicked Problem and How Can You Solve It?, 
INTERACTION DESIGN FOUND., https://www.interaction-design.org/literature/article/wicked-
problems-5-steps-to-help-you-tackle-wicked-problems-by-combining-systems-thinking-with-agile-
methodology (last visited Nov. 2, 2020) [https://perma.cc/Y9MV-K2LW] (proposing “systems 
thinking” process as “perfect for wicked problems” when paired with “agile methodology,” an 
“iterative approach” that “helps to improve solutions through collaboration”). 
 63.  See, e.g., ROBERT E. HORN & ROBERT P. WEBER, STRATEGY KINETICS, NEW TOOLS FOR 
RESOLVING WICKED PROBLEMS: MESS MAPPING AND RESOLUTION MAPPING PROCESSES 5 (2007), 
https://www.strategykinetics.com//New_Tools_For_Resolving_Wicked_Problems.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/8VA9-YDBM] (recommending “mess mapping” for problem solving “so that stakeholders 
arrive at a common framework for understanding these problems”). 
 64.   See, e.g., C.J.A.M. Termeer, A. Dewulf, S.I. Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, M. Vink & M. van 
Vliet, Coping with the Wicked Problem of Climate Adaptation Across Scales: The Five R Governance 
Capabilities, 154 LANDSCAPE & URB. PLAN. 11, 14 (2016) (describing resilience, among other 
features, as crucial to governance of wicked problems). See infra notes 183–190 and  
accompanying text. 
 65.  See infra notes 205–208 and accompanying text.  
 66.  See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive 
Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1, 18–27 (2014) (describing adaptive management and strategies 
for better accommodating it in regulatory processes).  
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review reveals that these limitations are particularly evident and 
problematic in light of global anthropogenic climate change.67 
II. THE GOALS AND TOOLS OF PUBLIC BIODIVERSITY GOVERNANCE 
Though the wicked problems literature has not explored how 
substantive governance might be reshaped to better manage 
wickedness, natural resources law has certainly instituted a range of 
substantive strategies aimed at reducing certain causes of biodiversity 
loss. Statutes at various governmental scales have conventionally 
focused on regulating prospective development, reserving lands for 
various purposes, or restricting invasive species. While these largely 
preservationist strategies may have always been imperfect proxies for 
biodiversity conservation, they are particularly inadequate for 
curtailing biodiversity loss in the context of global climate change. Even 
more flexible passive management strategies—such as public lands 
focused on maximizing yield, wildlife corridors, and private 
conservation incentives—are only partly tethered to promoting 
biodiversity in light of large-scale shifts in ecological conditions. As a 
result, natural resources law has limited substantive legal adaptive 
capacity, and those goals and strategies that are more accommodating 
of change are not directed primarily at maximizing prospective 
biodiversity conservation. 
A. Regulate Development Causing Future Biodiversity Loss 
The most direct strategy employed today for promoting species 
conservation in the United States may be the regulation of private and 
public development.68 This strategy has primarily focused on promoting 
a particular aspect of biodiversity—namely, preventing species 
extinction and, to a lesser extent, avoiding species from being in danger 
of going extinct.69 The chief strategy for achieving this end has been to 
 
 67.  See Daniel Schramm & Akiva Fishman, Legal Frameworks for Adaptive Natural 
Resource Management in a Changing Climate, 22 GEO. INT’L ENV’T L. REV. 491, 497 (2010) 
(arguing that weaknesses in the ability of legal regimes to respond to climate change “stem from 
both rigidity in the administrative procedures of the law and the absence of mandates to achieve 
long-term tangible objectives”). 
 68.  See, e.g., ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, ROBERT H. ABRAMS, ROBERT L. GRAHAM, LISA 
HEINZERLING, DAVID A. WIRTH & NOAH D. HALL, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, 
AND SOCIETY 422–23 (5th ed. 2016). 
 69.  See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (aiming “to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon 
which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved, [and] to provide a 
program for the conservation of such endangered species and threatened species”). 
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prevent or minimize affirmative, relatively direct human actions that 
would harm designated species. 
The Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) is the clearest example of 
this strategy. Congress enacted the ESA to promote “better 
safeguarding, for the benefit of all citizens, the Nation’s heritage in fish, 
wildlife, and plants,”70 recognizing that many vulnerable species are of 
“esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific 
value.”71 In addition, the ESA declares as a primary purpose not only 
the protection of endangered species but also the conservation of the 
ecosystems upon which such species depend.72 
However, the key regulatory hooks of the ESA—sections 7, 9, 
and 10—are all reactive, each placing restrictions on human activity 
that affirmatively harms species listed as threatened or endangered.73 
Section 7 prohibits any federal action74 that would “jeopardize the 
continued existence”75 of any listed species or result in the modification 
of its “critical habitat.”76 Section 9 strictly prohibits the “take” of any 
endangered species by any person, public or private.77 The statute 
broadly extends the stringent ban on taking to include “harass, harm, 
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt 
to engage in any such conduct,”78 and subsequent judicial opinions have 
upheld expansive regulatory interpretations of this language to include 
the substantial modification of habitat.79 Each of these restrictions 
 
 70.  Id. § 1531(a)(5). 
 71.  Id. § 1531(a)(3). 
 72.  See id. § 1531(b); see also Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 
U.S. 687, 699–700 (1995) (acknowledging that the ESA serves to protect vulnerable ecosystems, 
with listed species functioning as an indicator that the underlying ecosystem is faltering). 
 73.  Listing is based on an assessment of the risk of extinction that relies on “the best 
scientific and commercial data available.” 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A). 
 74.  Action includes any activity “authorized, funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by 
Federal agencies.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2019). 
 75.  16 U.S.C. § 1536(a). See also Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978) (finding 
jeopardy determination must be made strictly without regard to costs and benefits of the proposed 
agency action).  
 76.  16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2). 
 77.  Id. § 1538(a)(1). For threatened species, the take prohibition is not automatic; the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service may apply the ban at its discretion, see id. § 1533(d), which it has done 
in most cases. See TIMOTHY BEATLEY, HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING: ENDANGERED SPECIES 
AND URBAN GROWTH 17 (1994). 
 78.  16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).  
 79.  See Palila v. Haw. Dep’t of Land & Nat. Res., 639 F.2d 495, 497 (9th Cir. 1981) (defining 
“harm” “to include activity that results in significant environmental modification or degradation 
of the endangered animal's habitat”); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 
515 U.S. 687, 965 (1995) (finding that the secretary of the interior acted reasonably in 
“promulgat[ing] a regulation that defines the [ESA’s] prohibition on takings to include ‘significant 
habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife’ ”).  
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focuses primarily on limiting relatively direct human actions that cause 
biodiversity loss and secondarily on guarding fragmented habitat, 
rather than fostering species recovery, comprehensive ecosystem 
conservation, or other measures of biodiversity.80 
Even section 10, often lauded as a way to promote more 
comprehensive constructions of ecosystem conservation, focuses on 
minimizing direct harm to listed species. Added later to the ESA to 
allow the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) and the National 
Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”)81—collectively referred to here as 
“the Services” or individually as “the Service”—to issue “incidental 
take” permits, section 10 allows private and public permittees to harm 
or even destroy members of a protected species if incidental82 and 
undertaken in conjunction with an approved habitat conservation plan 
(“HCP”).83 Notably, this change to the ESA expressly allows biodiversity 
loss so long as (1) the harm’s impacts are mitigated “to the maximum 
extent practicable,” (2) the applicant provides “adequate” funding, (3) 
the likelihood of survival and recovery of the species is not “appreciably” 
reduced, and (4) the plan includes any other “necessary or  
appropriate” measures.84 
A number of permittees have agreed to design their HCPs not 
merely to restrict development but also to consider a more expansive 
biodiversity focus, including managing indirect stressors such as 
invasive species or habitat fragmentation.85 Moreover, some HCPs have 
focused on protecting not only specifically listed species but also other 
vulnerable species, habitat, or ecological communities.86 
 
 80.  See LAURA HOOD, FRAYED SAFETY NETS: CONSERVATION PLANNING UNDER THE 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 3 (1998); Craig W. Thomas, Habitat Conservation Planning: Certainly 
Empowered, Somewhat Deliberative, Questionably Democratic, 29 POL. & SOC’Y 105, 107 (2001). 
 81. The ESA is primarily administered by the secretary of the interior through the FWS for 
land and freshwater species and by the secretary of commerce through the National Marine 
Fisheries Service for marine species. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15) (defining “secretary”); id. 
§ 1533(a)(2); 50 C.F.R. § 424.01 (2019) (FWS-NMFS joint regulations).  
 82.  An “incidental take” is broadly defined as any taking “that result[s] from, but [is] not the 
purpose of, carrying out an otherwise lawful activity conducted by the Federal agency or 
applicant.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. 
 83.  The Services may issue a permit to private or non-federal public actors that authorize 
the incidental take of a listed species in conjunction with an approved habitat conservation plan 
(“HCP”). 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a). Federal agencies and federal permittees can also circumvent the 
section 9 prohibitions if the Service issues an incidental take statement (“ITS”) through the section 
7 interagency consultation process. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(b)(4), 1539(a)(1)(B).  
 84.  16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2). 
 85.  Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in Maladaptive 
Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293, 303, 305 (2007). 
 86.  See William Vogel & Lorin Hicks, Multi-species HCPs: Experiments with the Ecosystem 
Approach, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/endangered/what-we-do/bulletins/ 
multi-species-hcp.html (last updated Aug. 28, 2012) [https://perma.cc/45HP-VDU2] (describing 
2–Camacho_PAGE.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/12/20  11:30 AM 
2020] PUBLIC GOVERNANCE & BIODIVERSITY 1599 
Nonetheless, even these plans still remain directed at promoting 
a static conception of preexisting biotic communities or assemblages 
and are not tethered to conceptions of ecological health that internalize 
ecological change.87 In fact, the ESA is focused on conservation that is 
largely (though not exclusively) directed at maintaining biodiversity 
where it historically was and resisting change.88 Moreover, the chief 
U.S. legal regime for promoting biodiversity conservation is not focused 
on actively addressing many of the conventional cumulative stressors 
leading to biodiversity loss. Indeed, many have recognized the ESA’s 
emphasis on preventing development has had limited success in 
reversing most of the stressors causing biodiversity loss.89 
Notably, ESA section 4 does generally require the Services to 
develop and implement recovery plans for the conservation and survival 
of listed species.90 Plans include a range of strategies for recovering and 
ultimately delisting endangered species, including “restoring and 
acquiring habitat, removing invasive species, conducting surveys, 
monitoring individual populations, and breeding species in captivity to 
release them into their historic range.”91 Critically, however, recovery 
plans are unenforceable guidance, so that “no agency or entity is 
required by the ESA to implement actions in a recovery plan.”92 
Moreover, most plans lack sufficient funding for carrying out planned 
recovery measures.93 Finally, by design, adopted recovery plans focus 
on accomplishing recovery of a particular listed species, not the broader 
fitness of particular ecosystems or ecological functions. Though 
recovery of listed species would improve or at least maintain species 
biodiversity, even full implementation of a recovery plan (and thus 
recovery of a listed species) may not stem other significant biodiversity 
concerns (such as the health of non-listed species or ecological functions 
not directly tethered to the listed species). 
 
HCPs used to restore aquatic habitats, protect caves, and accomplish other objectives beyond solely 
protecting listed species). 
 87.  Alejandro E. Camacho, Going the Way of the Dodo: De-extinction, Dualisms, and 
Reframing Conservation, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 849, 878 (2015). 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Camacho, supra note 85, at 346 & n.309. 
 90.  16 U.S.C. § 1539(a).  
 91.  Endangered Species Recovery Program, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (June 2011), 
https://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/recovery.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PYX-SD6V]. 
 92.  Recovery: Overview, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/endangered/what-
we-do/recovery-overview.html (last updated June 10, 2020) [https://perma.cc/B3HT-LQVD]. 
 93.  Alejandro E. Camacho, Michael Robinson-Dorn, Asena Cansu Yildiz & Tara Teegarden, 
Assessing State Laws and Resources for Endangered Species Protection, 47 ENV’T L. REP. NEWS & 
ANALYSIS 10837, 10842–43 (2017). 
2–Camacho_PAGE.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/12/20  11:30 AM 
1600 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:6:1585 
This is tied to another limitation of the ESA: it is primarily 
focused on goals other than ecological health or productivity. As I have 
argued elsewhere, the ESA’s conception of biodiversity is largely linked 
to historical preservation—protecting or restoring species where they 
are or used to be—and secondarily on wildness preservation, or limiting 
human intervention in ecological processes.94 Even the ESA is reticent 
to allow interventions designed to promote future ecological function or 
health, with the few more active strategies used (such as captive 
breeding and translocations) focused primarily on restoration and  
not on advancing ecological health in light of anticipated  
climatic conditions.95 
B. Reserving, Preserving, and/or Restoring Land 
The dominant public biodiversity conservation strategy in the 
United States, and even globally, may not be regulation of development 
but rather reserved lands—setting aside public lands and managing 
them to promote conservation.96 About twenty-eight percent of all land 
in the United States is federally owned and managed,97 with additional 
state lands augmenting this number. Most of this land is set aside for a 
range of natural resource purposes that historically have been 
understood as, at least in part, promoting the conservation of 
biodiversity.98 But it is increasingly clear that these core  
management goals are at best imperfect surrogates for, and  
 
 94.  Camacho, supra note 87, at 878–79. The term “historical preservation,” used here to 
describe ecological preservation or restoration to a historical baseline, is related to but 
distinguishable from “historic preservation,” employed in other contexts (such as certain programs 
of the National Park Service) focused on the built environment and resources primarily of 
significance to American history or prehistory. See, e.g., 54 U.S.C. § 302101 (establishing the 
National Register of Historic Places). 
 95.  Camacho, supra note 87, at 878–79. 
 96.  See, e.g., Terry L. Erwin, An Evolutionary Basis for Conservation Strategies, 253 SCIENCE 
750, 750 (1991) (“National parks, wildlife refuges, biosphere reserves, military reserves, Indian 
reservations, and other forms of legally protected areas have been established for aesthetic, 
political, or practical purposes in the last 150 years.”); C.R. Margules & R.L. Pressey, Systematic 
Conservation Planning, 405 NATURE 243, 243 (2000) (describing the ancient human practice of 
preserving lands and the basic role of modern reserves); Frank J. Rahel, Britta Bierwagen & 
Yoshinori Taniguchi, Managing Aquatic Species of Conservation Concern in the Face of Climate 
Change and Invasive Species, 22 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 551, 552 (2008) (discussing how reserves 
“are the mainstay of current conservation efforts”). 
 97.  ROSS W. GORTE, CAROL HARDY VINCENT, LAURA A. HANSON & MARC R. ROSENBLUM, 
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42346, FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW AND DATA 3  (2012), 
https://cdn.cnsnews.com/documents/FEDERAL%20OWNERSHIP%20OF%20LAND-CRS-
2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BXX-6RKQ]. 
  98.  The most significant exception is the approximately nineteen million acres of land 
managed by the Department of Defense. Id. at 1, 13. 
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perhaps even antagonistic to, long-term ecological health and 
biodiversity conservation. 
Federal public lands have been set aside for a range of natural 
resource uses and goals. One hundred and ninety-three million acres of 
national forests are managed by the United States Forest Service 
(“USFS”) pursuant to the National Forest Management Act.99 Nearly 
248 million acres of Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) land is 
managed under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 
1976.100 The national park system is managed by the National Park 
Service (“NPS”), which most prominently includes over fifty-two million 
acres of designated national parks101 managed under the National Park 
Service Organic Act.102 And approximately eighty-nine million acres of 
terrestrial federal wildlife refuges are administered by the FWS 
pursuant to the National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act 
(“NWRSIA”).103 In addition, 111 million acres of the above-listed federal 
lands are specially designated by Congress to be federal wilderness104 
and subject to an additional overlay of regulation pursuant to the 
Wilderness Act of 1964.105 
To varying degrees, public land laws each anticipate promoting 
biodiversity, but only indirectly or secondarily through other 
conservation objectives. National parks, for instance, primarily 
emphasize historical preservation—preserving or even restoring 
preexisting species or assemblages where they were or are, typically 
tethered to a baseline of pre-European settlement.106 This objective has 
surely helped preserve substantial biodiversity as compared to 
analogous lands subject to human disturbance such as urban, 
suburban, or agricultural development. Yet minimizing or reversing 
biodiversity loss is not the primary focus; rather, it is on preserving 
 
 99.  National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687. The Forest Service’s Organic 
Administration Act of 1897, 16 U.S.C. § 475, created the USFS, and the Multiple-Use Sustained-
Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531, broadened the use objectives of the national forests to 
include “outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes.” Id. § 528. 
 100.  Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1785. 
 101.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012, at 772 
(2012), https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/2011/compendia/statab/131ed/2012-
statab.pdf  [https://perma.cc/4PKR-7YEB]. 
 102.  National Park Service Organic Act of 1916, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (repealed 2014). 
 103.  National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd, 668ee. 
 104.  See The Beginnings of the National Wilderness Preservation System, WILDERNESS 
CONNECT,  https://wilderness.net/learn-about-wilderness/fast-facts/default.php  (last updated Dec. 
8, 2016) [https://perma.cc/7V8K-4XLL] (describing the growth of the National Wilderness 
Preservation System (“NWPS”) since its beginning in 1964). 
 105.  Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1336. 
 106.  Alejandro E. Camacho, Assisted Migration: Redefining Nature and Natural Resource 
Law Under Climate Change, 27 YALE J. ON REGUL. 171, 218 (2010). 
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preexisting conditions. In other words, maintaining historical fidelity 
may not necessarily promote biodiversity. 
A complement or corollary to historical preservation is ecological 
restoration—or assisted recovery—of an ecosystem previously 
damaged, degraded, or destroyed by human action.107 It draws 
extensively on scientific tools provided by the ecological science 
subdiscipline of restoration ecology.108 This approach customarily seeks 
to restore disturbed ecosystems to some past baseline,109 though the 
particular target baseline may be contentious and value-laden,110 and 
some formulations seek to capaciously conceptualize restoration to 
advance other conservation values such as ecological integrity.111 The 
ongoing Florida Everglades restoration, sanctioned by Congress in 
1996,112 is a prominent application and includes goals such as 
restoration of historic hydrology, improvement of local water quality, 
protection of existing natural habitats, and prevention, eradication, 
containment, and management of incursions of invasive species.113 As 
with historical preservation, the focus in the Everglades project is on 
restoration as a surrogate for reversing biodiversity loss, but the stated 
 
 107.  See, e.g., What is Ecological Restoration?, SOC’Y FOR ECOLOGICAL RESTORATION, https:// 
www.ser-rrc.org/what-is-ecological-restoration/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2020) [https://perma.cc/ 
6MGJ-K7CV] (“Ecological restoration seeks to initiate or accelerate ecosystem recovery following 
damage, degradation, or destruction.”). 
 108.  See generally Eric Higgs, The Two-Culture Problem: Ecological Restoration and the 
Integration of Knowledge, 13 RESTORATION ECOLOGY 159 (2005) (recommending a broader 
approach to restoration and recognizing that the practice of restoration has begun to narrowly 
focus on the science of restoration ecology). 
 109.  See, e.g., Richard J. Hobbs, Restoration Ecology: The Challenge of Social Values and 
Expectations, 2 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENV’T 43, 43 (2004) (“[T]he objective of restoration is often 
to return the system to some previous state, often one that existed prior to human influence, such 
as pre-Columbian North America.”).  
 110.  Baseline is inevitably a value choice and may be contentious. See id. at 43 (discussing 
how choice plays a contentious role in restoration and the values that are considered when 
determining restoration goals); Robert T. Lackey, Societal Values and the Proper Role of 
Restoration Ecologists, 2 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENV’T 45, 45 (2004) (describing how society’s goals 
and values are often fragmented, and in turn, “technocrats have an understandable impulse to 
insert what they think is, or should be, the appropriate goal”). 
 111.  See Young D. Choi, Restoration Ecology to the Future: A Call for New Paradigm, 15 
RESTORATION ECOLOGY 351, 351 (2007) (recommending that restoration no longer focus on 
returning ecosystems to a certain point in the past and instead focus on the future). 
 112.  U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Office of Everglades Restoration Initiatives, 
EVERGLADESRESTORATION.GOV, https://www.evergladesrestoration.gov/oeri/ (last visited Sept. 26, 
2020) [https://perma.cc/4B3F-TD64]. 
 113.  See Everglades Restoration Goals, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://nps.maps.arcgis.com/apps/ 
MapSeries/index.html?appid=e5fd5d9df4944b5ab10a727227aef5fe (last visited Aug. 13, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/4DKT-S3ZX] (providing details on eight “subgoals” for Everglades restoration). 
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goal is historical fidelity, rather than biodiversity directly.114 Similarly, 
areas designated as federal wilderness emphasize wildness or “natural” 
preservation, or the minimization of direct human intervention.115 
Though this goal may historically have helped reduce direct human 
interferences that could result in biodiversity loss, it too is an imperfect 
surrogate for biodiversity—particularly for causes of biodiversity loss 
that are much more indirect.116 
Other lands managed by the USFS and BLM focus on 
maintaining multiple uses.117 More recent adjustments of multiple-use 
objectives for these lands do emphasize sustainability, which is 
described as maintenance of ecological function or integrity under at 
least some interpretations.118 But promoting any conception of long-
term biodiversity conservation has historically been far from the first 
priority of either agency.119 These lands have primarily been driven by 
 
 114.  See id. Specifically, some goals driven by historical fidelity include restoring nine 
thousand square miles of lost habitat and returning the region to its original hydrology and 
waterflow. See id. 
 115.  Camacho, supra note 87, at 882. 
 116.  See Legal Adaptive Capacity, supra note 19, at 792 (“This focus on promoting historical 
fidelity provides limited substantive legal adaptive capacity for NPS managers to engage in 
proactive adaptation measures. The tension between fostering active climate change adaptation 
strategies that seek to advance future ecological health and the NPS's fundamentally historical 
preservation goals is obvious.”). 
 117.  Both the National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e)(1), and the Federal Land 
Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(7), require that their respective lands be 
managed for multiple uses. 
 118.  See Lia Helena Monteiro de Lima Demange, The Principle of Resilience, 30 PACE ENV’T 
L. REV. 695, 808 (2013) (defining ecological resilience as the human’s duty to not impair ecological 
maintenance by overusing or depleting resources); Aphrodite Smagadi, Analysis of the Objectives 
of the Convention on Biological Diversity: Their Interrelation and Implementation Guidance for 
Access and Benefit Sharing, 31 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 243, 263 (2006) (discussing the socioeconomic 
paradigm related to development, sustainability, and ethics, and how the maintenance of 
ecological integrity falls within this paradigm); Susan L. Smith, Ecologically Sustainable 
Development: Integrating Economics, Ecology, and Law, 31 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 261, 280 (1995) 
(listing the goals of the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources’ 
1996 Conference on Conservation and Development). 
 119.  Holly Doremus, Science Plays Defense: Natural Resource Management in the Bush 
Administration, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 249, 282 (2005) (describing the USFS and the BLM as agencies 
“whose history and culture puts furthering the interests of extractive industries and local 
communities first”). 
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consumptive uses, such as timber harvesting,120 grazing,121 and mineral 
development,122 and not long-term ecological health. 
The National Wildlife Refuge System (“National Refuges”) is in 
some sense a hybrid of preservation and sustainable-use goals. The 
NWRSIA123 alone does not necessarily restrict management of National 
Refuges to preserving historical ecological conditions, directing the 
FWS to “ensure that the biological integrity, diversity, and 
environmental health of the System are maintained.”124 As such, it 
offers the FWS “some ability to manage wildlife refuges in ways that 
allow modification of ecological constituents over time.”125 The FWS’s 
implementing regulations and policies,126 however, strongly stress 
“maintaining current environmental conditions or restoring species and 
habitats to some desired former condition.”127 As such, the FWS allows 
 
 120.  See, e.g., Steven A. Daugherty, The Unfulfilled Promise of an End to Timber Dominance 
on the Tongass: Forest Service Implementation of the Tongass Timber Reform Act, 24 ENV’T L. 1573, 
1585 n.67 (1994) (“[T]he Forest Service, after years of regulating and cooperating with the timber 
industry in Alaska, will attempt to protect the interests of the timber industry in any situation in 
which it perceives ambiguity as to the requirements imposed upon it.”); see also Sierra Club v. 
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 748 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that the Forest Service “has 
been notorious for its alignment with lumber companies, although its mandate from Congress 
directs it to consider the various aspects of multiple use in its supervision of the national forests”). 
 121.  See, e.g., Debra L. Donahue, Western Grazing: The Capture of Grass, Ground, and 
Government, 35 ENV’T L. 721, 727–29 (2005) (exploring reasons for ranchers’ domination of BLM 
resource management policies). 
 122.  See Kelly Nolen, Residents at Risk: Wildlife and the Bureau of Land Management's 
Planning Process, 26 ENV’T L. 771, 776 (1996) (describing why the BLM has given greater weight 
to the interests of the grazing and mining industries); Harold J. Krent & Nicholas S. Zeppos, 
Monitoring Governmental Disposition of Assets: Fashioning Regulatory Substitutes for Market 
Controls, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1705, 1719–20 (1999) (discussing government’s tendency to give away 
mineral rights and collect royalties on mining that effectively raise government revenues). 
 123.  National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd-6668ee. 
 124.  Id. § 668dd(a)(4)(B).  
 125.  Legal Adaptive Capacity, supra note 19, at 776–77. 
 126.  See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 601 FW 3, BIOLOGICAL INTEGRITY, DIVERSITY, AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH (2006), https://www.fws.gov/policy/601fw3.pdf [https://perma.cc/RNF6-
JECF] (defining “biological integrity” as “[b]iotic composition, structure, and functioning at 
genetic, organism, and community levels comparable with historic conditions, including the 
natural biological processes that shape genomes, organisms, and communities”); id. (defining 
“historic conditions” as “[c]omposition, structure, and functioning of ecosystems resulting from 
natural processes that we believe, based on sound professional judgment, were present prior to 
substantial human related changes to the landscape”).  
 127.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-253, CLIMATE CHANGE: VARIOUS ADAPTATION 
EFFORTS ARE UNDER WAY AT KEY NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT AGENCIES 19 (2013), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654991.pdf [https://perma.cc/UG69-ZF8Q]; see also J.B. Ruhl & 
James Salzman, Gaming the Past: The Theory and Practice of Historic Baselines in the 
Administrative State, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1, 18 (2011) (“[T]he FWS strives to manage the nation’s 
wildlife refuges toward a baseline of ‘historic conditions.’ ”). 
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the introduction of non-native species, but only rarely.128 Again,  
this limitation is consistent primarily with an interest in  
promoting historical preservation, rather than maximizing  
prospective biodiversity. 
C. Invasive Species and Other Wildlife Management Laws 
To varying extents, other wildlife management laws at least 
indirectly target reducing biodiversity loss from human activity. In 
particular, a broad range of international, federal, and state invasive 
species laws seek to reduce the movement of species outside their native 
range. They typically prohibit, restrict, and/or manage the movement 
of plants and animals into, out of, or within a jurisdiction. These laws 
often institute a permitting process for the importation129 and/or 
release130 of certain species, with some regimes developing lists of 
prohibited species131 while others elect to generate lists of species not 
requiring permits.132 These laws in part have focused on preventing or 
mitigating the introduction and/or dispersal of certain (typically non-
native) species that outcompete native species.133 
Of course, many of these laws have not been particularly 
successful at stemming biodiversity loss from the proliferation of 
invasive species.134 Undoubtedly, underenforcement is a key part of this 
 
 128.  See Legal Adaptive Capacity, supra note 19, at 779–80 (“FWS regulations implementing 
the ESA make clear that nonnative introduction is supposed to be very rare . . . .”). 
 129.  See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.921 (2020) (prohibiting the import of venomous reptiles 
and insects without a permit); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-306 (2020) (prohibiting the import of live 
wildlife without authorization); IOWA CODE ANN. § 481A.47 (West 2020) (prohibiting the import of 
fish and game without a permit). 
 130.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-306 (prohibiting the release of live wildlife without 
authorization); CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 3515 (West 2020) (requiring approval to release 
nonresident game birds); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-292 (2020) (prohibiting the release of exotic species 
of wild animals). 
 131.  See, e.g., ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 220-2-.26 (2020) (providing list of prohibited species); GA. 
CODE ANN. §§ 27-5-4, 27-5-5 (2020) (providing list of species for which a license or permit is 
required); 3 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4219(a) (2020) (providing that “[t]he commission shall determine 
which species of fish are allowed to be propagated in each watershed”). 
 132.  See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 17, §§ 870.10(a)-870.10(b) (2020) (establishing the 
“Acquatic Life Approved Species List,” which “is comprised of specific species of aquatic life, within 
the categories of fish, crustaceans, gastropods, mollusks and plants”). 
 133.  See, e.g., National Invasive Species Act of 1996, 16 U.S.C. § 4701 (declaring the 
legislative purpose of preventing “unintentional introduction and dispersal of nonindigenous 
species into the waters of the United States”). 
 134.  See Clinton N. Jenkins, Kyle S. Van Houtan, Stuart L. Pimm & Joseph O. Sexton, US 
Protected Lands Mismatch Biodiversity Priorities, 112 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 5081 (2015) 
(asserting that the United States largely fails to protect biodiversity). 
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lack of success.135 Nonetheless, a core problem with many of these laws 
is that they are not focused on promoting long-term ecological health. 
Like some public land laws, many of these laws are almost 
reflexively directed at historical preservation—resisting the movement 
of any species not native to an area, without considering whether that 
movement aids or detracts from ecological health.136 Relatedly, some 
provisions maintain that a native species cannot be invasive (and thus 
restricted), even if the species reduces biodiversity.137 
Other invasive species provisions are focused more on natural 
preservation—preventing direct human introductions of species.138 
Intentional movement, whether or not beneficial for ecological health, 
is treated with skepticism, if not hostility.139 In contrast, under some 
such provisions, “natural” migration of a species is deemed acceptable, 
whether or not such movement reduces ecological health.140 
Contrast these laws with the lack of conservation restrictions on 
the introduction or movement of certain species that are very common, 
often non-native, and that, by most accounts, have had significant 
effects on biodiversity. Broad swaths of human-disturbed lands 
integrate livestock and monoculture crops141 (including cattle and 
wheat that are non-native to the United States142) that have 
significantly narrowed the nation’s biomass into a few categories. This 
reduction in diversity has largely remained untouched by invasive 
 
 135.  See Camacho et al., supra note 93 (analyzing state endangered species laws and 
concluding that most state regimes are inadequate). 
 136.  See Camacho, supra note 87, at 870–71 (arguing that U.S. species re-introduction laws 
largely focus on rigid classifications rather than ecological health). 
 137.  See e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,751, 81 Fed. Reg. 88,609, 88,610 (Dec. 8, 2016) (requiring a 
species to be non-native to qualify as an “invasive species” ). 
 138.  See, e.g., ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 220-2-.26 (focusing on prohibiting human introductions of 
listed species); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 17, §§ 870.10(a)-870.10(b) (proscribing human importation or 
possession of non-approved species); Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (making it unlawful to 
trade illegally acquired fish or wildlife); Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7702, 7711-7721, 
7731-7736, 7751-7761, 7771-7772, 7781-7786 (providing for the promulgation of regulations aimed 
at preventing the “spread of plant pests or noxious weeds”).  
 139.  See Camacho, supra note 106, at 176 (describing opposition to intentional movement as 
a strategy for responding to climate change). 
 140.  See, e.g., NAT’L PARK SERV., MANAGEMENT POLICIES § 4.4.4.1 (2006), https://www.nps. 
gov/policy/MP_2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HSD-RL7P]. 
 141.  See Census of Agriculture Highlights: Farms and Farmland, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (Aug. 
2019), https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Highlights/2019/2017Census_Farms_Farmland.p
df [https://perma.cc/4SJ2-NVEA] (noting that as of 2017, the United States had more than nine 
hundred million acres of farmland across approximately two million farms).  
 142.  See François Balfourier, Sophie Bouchet, Sandra Robert, Romain De Oliveira, Hélène 
Rimbert, Jonathan Kitt, Frédéric Choulet, International Wheat Genome Sequencing Consortium, 
BreedWheat Consortium & Etienne Pau, Worldwide Phylogeography and History of Wheat Genetic 
Diversity, SCI. ADVANCES, May 2019, at 1, 1 (describing the arrival of wheat in North America); 
G.A. Bowling, The Introduction of Cattle into Colonial North America, 25 J. DAIRY SCI. 129 (1942). 
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species laws, and in fact has received (and continues to receive) 
significant public subsidy.143 
D. Corridors and Private Incentives 
The dominant strategies for preventing further biodiversity loss 
have been reserving certain lands, limiting development that further 
harms endangered species, and curbing the introduction and movement 
of invasive species. There have, however, been a number of other 
attempts to build conservation strategies. These often have been more 
focused on reducing some of the indirect stressors that lead to 
biodiversity loss. 
Particularly notable have been the proliferating efforts to 
promote more comprehensive assessments of ecological conservation, 
such as ecosystem-based and landscape-level planning.144 Rather than 
focusing on a particular species, these approaches seek to manage 
ecological phenomena as a network, either at the ecosystem or broader 
landscape scale.145 The ESA in fact has been supplemented and 
 
 143.  See Dan Charles, Farmers Got Billions from Taxpayers in 2019, and Hardly Anyone 
Objected, NPR: THE SALT (Dec. 31, 2019, 4:13 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/ 
sections/thesalt/2019/12/31/790261705/farmers-got-billions-from-taxpayers-in-2019-and-hardly-
anyone-objected [https://perma.cc/YL38-YTKB] (detailing significant farm subsidies in the Unites 
States). At more provincial and international scales, governments have relied on other wildlife 
management laws that primarily seek to maintain the productivity of particular desired (usually 
game) species. See, e.g., Julie Lurman Joly, National Wildlife Refuges and Intensive Management 
in Alaska: Another Case for Preemption, 27 ALASKA L. REV. 27, 29 (2010): 
 Alaska's fish and wildlife management program, like most state wildlife programs, is 
geared toward providing hunting opportunities . . . . The intention of the program is to 
maintain a “sustained yield,” which the statute defines as “the achievement and 
maintenance in perpetuity of the ability to support a high level of human harvest of game, 
subject to preferences among beneficial uses, on an annual or periodic basis.”;  
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45615, INTERNATIONAL TROPHY HUNTING 10–11 (2019), 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45615 [https://perma.cc/48Q3-4HTJ] (examining 
various international, regional, and national wildlife laws, including those that encourage game 
hunting as part of a species protection program). Though these laws may have helped sustain 
ecological resources, they are not part of a coherent plan for promoting long-term ecological 
conservation and may actually be deemed to harm biodiversity. See, e.g., Palila v. Haw. Dep't of 
Land & Nat. Res., 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1082 (D. Haw. 1986) (concluding that the Hawaii wildlife 
agency’s sport-hunting program had harmed vital endangered species habitat biodiversity and 
violated the ESA). 
 144.  See John Kostyack, Joshua J. Lawler, Dale D. Goble, Julian D. Olden & J. Michael Scott, 
Beyond Reserves and Corridors: Policy Solutions to Facilitate the Movement of Plants and Animals 
in a Changing Climate, 61 BIOSCIENCE 713 (2011) (introducing policy options to prevent climate-
induced extinctions). 
 145.  See, e.g., Norman L. Christensen, Ann M. Bartuska, James H. Brown, Stephen 
Carpenter, Carla D'Antonio, Rober Francis, Jerry F. Franklin, James A. MacMahon, Reed F. Noss, 
David J. Parsons, Charles H. Peterson, Monica G. Turner & Robert G. Woodmansee, The Report 
of the Ecological Society of America Committee on the Scientific Basis for Ecosystem Management, 
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reworked to integrate consideration of ecosystem-based and landscape-
level management through initiatives such as the HCP program and 
recovery planning.146 
Relatedly, some management strategies have sought to foster 
ecological connectivity between governing jurisdictions as well as lands. 
This has included the creation and expansion of passive management 
techniques like wildlife corridors to potentially facilitate dispersal 
between protected areas.147 Intergovernmental planning and 
coordination have also played a role.148 Yet even these alternatives, 
when implemented, have mostly been fairly passive management 
strategies. In other words, they establish areas that merely allow the 
opportunity for migrations, alleviating but not eliminating  
dispersal barriers that fragment landscapes and thus further  
impair biodiversity.149 
Other strategies recognize that regulation of future development 
alone does not slow down biodiversity loss, let alone improve ecological 
health. As such, the need to offer incentives for private and other non-
reserve landowners to promote biodiversity has become increasingly 
clear.150 Under the ESA, for example, candidate conservation 
agreements, the No Surprises policy, and the Safe Harbors policy seek 
to provide incentives for private protection or reserves beyond 
regulatory prohibitions.151 These various strategies, including funding 
 
6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 665 (1996) (describing ecosystem-based management); Jeffrey Sayer, 
Terry Sunderland, Jaboury Ghazoul, Jean-Laurent Pfund, Douglas Sheil, Erik Meijaard, Michelle 
Venter, Agni Klintuni Boedhihartono, Michael Day, Claude Garcia, Cora van Oosten & Louise E. 
Buck, Ten Principles for a Landscape Approach to Reconciling Agriculture, Conservation, and 
Other Competing Land Uses, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 8349 (2013) (explaining  
landscape-level planning). 
 146.  Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, 96 Stat. 1411 (1982). 
 147.  See Kostyack et al., supra note 144, at 713–14 (discussing corridors as a potential, but 
ultimately insufficient, strategy to facilitate dispersal); Mark R. Christie & L. Lacey Knowles, 
Habitat Corridors Facilitate Genetic Resilience Irrespective of Species Dispersal Abilities or 
Population Sizes, 8 EVOLUTIONARY APPLICATIONS 454, 460–61 (2015) (observing that habitat 
corridors not only increase ecological health but also genetic resilience).  
 148.  E.g., DANIEL POLLAK, CAL. RSCH. BUREAU, THE FUTURE OF HABITAT CONSERVATION? THE 
NCCP EXPERIENCE IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 7 (2001) (depicting the program as “in many ways a 
joint state-federal initiative”). 
 149.  See, e.g., Wildlife Corridors, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/refuges/ 
features/wildlife-corridors.html (last updated Oct. 31, 2019) [https://perma.cc/L2P6-TX6D].  
 150.  See FRANK CASEY, SARA VICKERMAN, CHERYL HUMMON & BRUCE TAYLOR, DEFS. OF 
WILDLIFE, INCENTIVES FOR BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION: AN ECOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC 
ASSESSMENT 7–8 (2006) (explaining incentive programs). 
 151.  Candidate conservation agreements are voluntary compacts between the FWS and 
landowners to conserve species that are candidates for listing but not yet listed under the ESA. 
See Candidate Conservation Agreements, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (Oct. 2017), 
https://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/CCAs.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9K8-2NGD]. Safe 
harbor agreements are voluntary agreements in which a landowner agrees to contribute to a listed 
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of private conservation, attempt to encourage landowners to employ 
more active conservation measures, such as restoration, rather than 
just avoid development.152 As such, these potential strategies begin to 
acknowledge the influence of decisions that occur on human-dominated 
landscapes on biodiversity loss generally, and on reserved lands in 
particular, and seek to alter such activities. 
E. Substantive Limitations of Public Biodiversity Governance 
Though these prevailing strategies have always been at best 
imperfect promoters of biodiversity, they become especially inadequate 
in the context of global anthropogenic climate change. Each may have 
advanced a different, limited goal of biodiversity loss prevention: 
prevent species from going extinct, limit direct human destruction of 
habitat, restrict the introduction of invasive species, or set aside some 
areas for their natural resources. 
Yet none are surrogates for more comprehensive forms of 
biodiversity, such as ecological health. Many commenters have 
recognized that preventing further human development does not 
reverse and often may not even address biodiversity loss.153 Focusing 
on individual species that are most in danger of extinction may be 
necessary, but hardly sufficient, for stemming broader notions of 
biodiversity loss.154 Restricting the movement of invasive species may 
be useful but also difficult, if not counterproductive, if it retards 
 
species’ recovery and the FWS provides the landowner (1) assurance of no further requirements 
and (2) the right to return the land to its baseline condition when the agreement ends. For 
Landowners: Safe Harbor Agreements, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (Jan. 30, 2020), 
https://www.fws.gov/endangered/landowners/safe-harbor-agreements.html [https://perma.cc/ 
6JHA-HVP7]. The “no surprises” policy assures any landowner that, if that landowner agrees to 
an HCP, no additional obligations will be imposed should unforeseen circumstances arise. Habitat 
Conservation Plans: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (July 15,  
2013), https://www.fws.gov/endangered/what-we-do/hcp-faq.html [https://perma.cc/L9FZ-LNCN] 
(clarifying the “no surprises” policy within the HCPs). 
 152.  See sources cited supra note 151. 
 153.  See, e.g., LAURA C. HOOD, FRAYED SAFETY NETS: CONSERVATION PLANNING UNDER THE 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 1 (1998); Michael J. Bean & David S. Wilcove, Editorial, The Private-
Land Problem, 11 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1, 1 (1997) (describing absolute prohibition of habitat 
destruction as unsuccessful in protecting species on private land); Camacho, supra note 85, at 301 
(arguing that “merely preventing human development did little” to address biodiversity concerns); 
U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., USAID BIODIVERSITY POLICY 7–8 (2014) (detailing the drivers of 
biodiversity loss not addressed by merely limiting future development). 
 154.  See Carol A. Bloomgarden, Protecting Endangered Species Under Future Climate 
Change: From Single-Species Preservation to an Anticipatory Policy Approach, 19 ENV’T MGMT. 
641, 645 (1995) (asserting that policymakers should emphasize “proactive, dynamic protection” 
over individual species preservation).  
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valuable species movement.155 And biodiversity values are obviously not 
housed solely on protected areas. But these simple biodiversity 
management strategies are likely to be increasingly ineffective at 
averting more indirect biodiversity loss from large-scale shifts of 
conditions due to global anthropogenic climate change. 
For endangered species preservation, permit-by-permit 
regulatory hooks are not likely to even achieve the limited goal of 
preventing extinction of listed species when the core stressor is a change 
in climatic conditions that make the species less compatible with its 
existing habitat.156 Even the best large multispecies plans that rely on 
more comprehensive multispecies or ecosystem-based management 
focus on preserving or restoring preexisting assemblages of species.157 
Such plans are not set up to address when one such species is no longer 
compatible with the conditions wrought by climate change and needs to 
migrate elsewhere to thrive. Or when other species need to migrate into 
the plan area to survive. 
Reserved lands strategies focused on promoting historical 
preservation, restoration, or natural preservation may actually run 
counter to long-term ecological health. Myriad studies conclude that the 
rate and amount of strain on ecological resources from climate change 
is outside the range of historical variability, leading to fundamental 
ecological shifts and transformations.158 Nonintervention under such 
circumstances would allow change, but would also be at odds with 
promoting biodiversity in a number of contexts. Valued species will be 
unable to migrate without human assistance due to topographical and 
human-created physical and regulatory dispersal barriers,159 while  
 
 155.  See Camacho, supra note 106, at 255 (arguing that movement of non-native species could 
be valuable). 
 156.  See Bloomgarden, supra note 154, at 643–45 (1995) (declaring “the Endangered Species 
Act’s single-species, emergency-room approach” as likely a failure). 
 157.  See, e.g., LOWER COLO. RIVER MULTI-SPECIES CONSERVATION PROGRAM, https:// 
www.lcrmscp.gov/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2020) [https://perma.cc/Y6ZS-4SHW]. 
 158.  See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: 
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 62–70 (Christopher B. Field, Vicente R. Barros, David 
Jon Dokken, Katharine J. Mach, Michael D. Mastrandrea, T. Eren Bilir, Monalisa Chatterjee, 
Kristie L. Ebi, Yuka Otsuki Estrada, Robert C. Genova, Betelhem Girma, Eric S. Kissel, Andrew 
N. Levy, Sandy MacCracken,  Patricia R. Mastrandrea & Leslie L. White eds., 2014) (providing 
technical evidence demonstrating the impacts of climate change); U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RSCH. 
PROGRAM, FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, VOLUME II: IMPACTS, RISKS, AND 
ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED STATES 38 (2018) (illustrating various climate change indicators).  
 159.  See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 158, at 324 
(describing contemporary barriers to migration); see also Alejandro E. Camacho, Transforming the 
Means and Ends of Natural Resource Management, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1405, 1441 (2011) (describing 
topographical, physical, and regulatory barriers that are “likely to lead to increased conflict 
between inconsistent management objectives”). 
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new harmful species may be able to shift and reduce overall  
ecological health. 
Climate change heightens the potential conflict between 
noninterventionist and historical preservation objectives. With the 
large-scale shifts in climatic conditions, public land managers will 
increasingly be unable to simultaneously maintain or restore historical 
conditions and refrain from active management.160 
Climate change also accentuates the tension between the ESA’s 
species-focused conservation and public land management that 
concentrates on maintaining or restoring place-based historical fidelity. 
Of course, such tension already exists. For example, invasive species 
eradication as part of native ecosystem restoration may contravene the 
ESA if it were to adversely modify an endangered species’ critical 
habitat (e.g., when the invasive species provides food or shelter for an 
endangered species).161 But climate change is likely to make such 
conflicts much more common—for instance, if preserving a species in 
the face of global changes necessitates movement to new locations that 
is antithetical to restoration or preservation objectives. 
Regrettably, historical preservation and restoration are poorly 
positioned to counter biodiversity loss in a changing climate.162 
Conventional historical preservation and restoration strategies would 
seek to resist immigration of new species that need to shift to adapt to 
climate change, or they may require active promotion of preexisting 
species that are increasingly incompatible with changing climatic 
conditions.163 As I have stated elsewhere, “Climate change ensures that 
in many cases there will be escalating ecological and other costs, and 
diminishing gains from engaging in ecosystem preservation and 
restoration.”164 Similarly, invasive species laws that prevent species 
movement to maintain native historical conditions may promote 
 
 160.  See Camacho, supra note 159, at 1432–33 (arguing that active management has become 
virtually necessary to protect ecological systems). 
 161.  See, e.g., Michael L. Casazza, Cory T. Overton, Thuy-Vy D. Bui, Joshua M. Hull, Joy D. 
Albertson, Valary K. Bloom, Steven Bobzien, Jennifer McBroom, Marilyn Latta, Peggy Olofson, 
Tobias M. Rohmer, Steven Schwarzbach, Donald R. Strong, Erik Grijalva, Julian K. Wood, 
Shannon M. Skalos & John Takekawa, Endangered Species Management and Ecosystem 
Restoration: Finding the Common Ground, 21 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 19 (2016) (showing population 
increase of bird species due to habitat created by invasive plant species). 
 162.  See Camacho, supra note 159, at 1432 (“If maintaining the human-nature 
dichotomy . . . was ever an attainable goal, it certainly is not now.”). 
 163.  Id. at 1438–39 (arguing that conventional tactics will not withstand climate change).  
 164.  Id. at 1435. 
2–Camacho_PAGE.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/12/20  11:30 AM 
1612 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:6:1585 
biodiversity in some cases but hinder it in others, such as when a non-
native key “valuable” species needs to move to adapt.165 
National Forests and BLM lands, which are more fundamentally 
premised on maximizing productivity or sustained yield, in theory 
might actually be the most adaptable to climate change and 
biodiversity. This is because they allow for the possibility of 
adaptability to promote long-term ecological function or integrity.166 Yet 
the historical emphasis on consumptive uses and significant discretion 
provided to the BLM and USFS to implement their management 
mandates has ensured that these lands remain largely focused on 
maximizing the yield of certain desired species (such as timber or 
extractive uses) than on reducing biodiversity loss.167 
Finally, corridors and other strategies for improving 
connectivity may increase the opportunity for some species to 
migrate.168 But, unfortunately, they will not be feasible or helpful in a 
variety of circumstances, including for species with slow dispersal rates, 
in isolated areas, or to overcome large-scale dispersal barriers.169 
Moreover, such passive strategies still raise significant, value-laden 
questions regarding which species to facilitate and which to impede. 
Thus, many of the fundamental goals of existing natural resource 
governance, and the range of strategies used for achieving such 
objectives, are at best weakly tethered to reducing biodiversity loss. 
III. THE PROCEDURAL LIMITATIONS OF  
PUBLIC BIODIVERSITY GOVERNANCE 
As compared to substantive and structural governance, a 
comparatively substantial amount of attention has been paid in the 
planning, law, and management literatures most relevant to 
biodiversity loss to assessing public governance procedures and 
suggesting ways to better manage uncertainty and complexity. As 
explained earlier, wicked problems scholars have offered various 
methods for moderating wicked problems.170 Typically proposed by 
 
 165.  See Camacho, supra note 87, at 873–74 (describing the illogical duality between native 
and non-native preferences). 
 166.  See Legal Adaptive Capacity, supra note 19, at 745 (arguing that discretion increases 
legal adaptive capacity, thereby positioning land well to adapt to climate change). 
 167.  See id. at 744. 
 168.  See, e.g., Christie & Knowles, supra note 147, at 455, 460–61; Lars A. Brudvig, Ellen I. 
Damschen, Joshua J. Tewksbury, Nick M. Haddad & Douglas J. Levey, Landscape Connectivity 
Promotes Plant Biodiversity Spillover into Non-Target Habitats, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 9328, 
9330–31 (2009). 
 169.  Kostyack et al., supra note 144, at 713–14, 716. 
 170.  See supra notes 58–63 and accompanying text.  
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planning scholars, these methods predictably focus on a range of 
planning frameworks, steps, and techniques for incorporating diverse 
perspectives in order to foster iterative problem-solving.171 
In the environmental management and law context, which is 
especially pertinent to biodiversity loss, an established literature on 
adaptive management has similarly developed on the limitations of 
governmental processes for coping with uncertainty and change.172 
Unfortunately, public biodiversity governance’s procedural legal 
adaptive capacity remains limited. The standard public processes used 
for implementing public biodiversity management and for regulating 
private activity have not been well structured to promote learning and 
manage the substantial uncertainties and evolving character of 
ecological resources. More recent attempts to integrate adaptive 
management—coping with uncertainty through provisional 
decisionmaking, monitoring, and adjustment—remain limited but hold 
significant promise for better managing the complexities of biodiversity 
loss and changing ecological conditions. 
A. Inflexible Conventional Public Processes 
Conventional administrative law is far from adaptive. As 
uncertainty is often understood to be a characteristic trait of 
environmental risk,173 even more routine natural resources decisions 
are regularly made in a context of limited information.174 Conventional 
administrative procedures regularly used in natural resources law, 
such as notice-and-comment rulemaking or permitting as codified in the 
 
 171.  See, e.g., Kunz & Rittel, supra note 58, at 2 (discussing how the process of discourse and 
information exchange supports problem solving); Jeff Conklin, Dialogue Mapping: Breaking  
the Chains of Linear Process, COGNEXUS INST. 3, 11 (2007)  http://www.cognexus.org/ 
webinars/Webinar-new.pdf [https://perma.cc/76XJ-K59K] (detailing dialogue mapping as an 
approach to solving wicked problems); Rosenhead, supra note 60, at 119–20 (proposing a 
participative and interactive method for complex problem solving); Ritchey, supra note 61, at 5–6 
(discussing General Morphological Analysis); Jesus Navarro, Peter Hayward & Joseph Voros, How 
to Solve a Wicked Problem? Furniture Foresight Case Study, 10 FORESIGHT 11, 11–12 (2008) 
(suggesting a “morphological foresight” approach to resolving wicked problems); HORN & WEBER, 
supra note 63, at 5 (proposing mess mapping and resolution mapping for resolving  
wicked problems). 
 172.  See infra notes 173–182 and accompanying text. As these critiques are prevalent and 
well known in the literature, this Part only briefly summarizes them in the context of public 
biodiversity governance.  
 173.  See Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing and the Precautionary Principle, 108 COLUM. L. 
REV. 494, 498–99 (2008); Talbot Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 207, 208–09 (1978). 
 174.  Camacho, supra note 159, at 1414. 
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Administrative Procedure Act,175 are not well designed for managing 
uncertainty or reducing mistakes.176 This is primarily because they rely 
on a static comprehensive rationality or front-end model of government 
decisionmaking,177 which assumes agencies can and should focus most 
of their attention and resources on initial decisions that are at best 
occasionally revisited to account for new information or changes in 
circumstances.178 Permitting also leans heavily on applicants, whose 
incentives often do not align with biodiversity conservation, for 
information generation and analysis.179 
This front-end approach is especially problematic for 
implementing “ecological resilience strategies when variability is on the 
rise and prediction is unreliable.”180 In addition, though ambient and 
post-decision monitoring are often required, they often are poorly 
resourced or otherwise deficient.181 Even rarer is the adjustment of 
initial decisions to account for new information.182 
B. Limited Attempts to Promote Procedural Adaptive Capacity 
As a result of these shortcomings, many scholars have called for 
the integration of “adaptive management”183—systematic monitoring, 
 
 175.  See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559; id. §§ 551(5), 551(7) (defining rulemaking and adjudication); id. 
§§ 701-706 (providing for judicial review of agency action). 
 176.  See, e.g., Craig R. Allen, Joseph J. Fontaine, Kevin L. Pope & Ahjond S. Garmestani, 
Adaptive Management for a Turbulent Future, 92 J. ENV’T MGMT. 1339, 1343 (2011). 
 177.  Craig & Ruhl, supra note 66, at 4. 
 178.  Camacho, supra note 159, at 1414; Craig & Ruhl, supra note 66, at 4–5. 
 179.  See Camacho, supra note 85, at 324–26 (“Because the HCP program relies so heavily on 
the permittees . . . , monitoring under the HCP program requires a high level of faith that 
permittees have both the incentive and the ability to assess conformity with public goals.”). 
 180.  Ruhl, supra note 20, at 1393. 
 181.  See, e.g., Eric Biber, The Problem of Environmental Monitoring, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 
34–52 (2011) (highlighting internal and external obstacles and disincentives agencies face in 
development and implementation of monitoring programs); MGMT. SYS. INT’L, AN INDEPENDENT 
EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE’S NATIONAL 
WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM 20 (2008), https://www.fws.gov/refuges/pdfs/NWRS_Evaluation_ 
FullReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/VVV3-LHBW] (“[O]nly 11% of refuge managers surveyed 
described the current level of inventory and monitoring work as being mostly or fully sufficient.”); 
Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 28–29 
(1997) (discussing how flexible government regimes will “produce better rules that are more likely 
to accomplish legislative goals” and that rules should be “revised in light of experience”). 
 182.  See Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing 
Uncertainty Through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1, 37–38, 64 (2009) (“Because such 
experiments fail to provide incentives for regulators and managers to work with and learn from 
their counterparts, existing collaborative efforts have added yet another layer of fragmentation to 
the already disjointed regulatory landscape.”); Freeman, supra note 181, at 16–17. 
 183.  E.g., INT’L INST. FOR APPLIED SYS. ANALYSIS, ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 
AND MANAGEMENT 1 (C.S. Holling ed., 1978); C.S. Holling, Lance H. Gunderson & Donald Ludwig, 
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assessment, and adjustment of resource management decisions—and 
similar strategies that promote provisionalism and experimentalism184 
to manage uncertainty in natural resources decisionmaking. A growing 
number of government authorities claim to adopt and rely on adaptive 
management strategies in managing or regulating the use of natural 
resources.185 Some have suggested it is vital in the context of addressing 
biodiversity loss, particularly for adapting to the effects of global 
climate change on ecological resources.186 Though formal adaptive 
management may not be appropriate in all contexts,187 broad-scale 
integration of even less rigorously adaptive strategies, such as 
contingency188 or scenario planning,189 would nonetheless still promote 
legal adaptive capacity.190 
Systematic employment of any of these more adaptive processes, 
however, remains atypical. In the context of biodiversity conservation, 
there have been numerous useful attempts to engage in more adaptive, 
coordinated processes. The most thorough effort to do so under the ESA 
 
In Quest of a Theory of Adaptive Change, in PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN 
HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS 3, 21–22 (Lance H. Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds., 2002); GEORGE 
H. STANKEY, ROGER N. CLARK & BERNARD T. BORMANN, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ADAPTIVE 
MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES: THEORY, CONCEPTS, AND MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONS 31–
33 (2005), www.fs.fed.us/pnw/pubs/pnw_gtr654.pdf [https://perma.cc/PH4N-M9RM].  
 184.  Freeman, supra note 181, at 28–29; Michael C. Dorf & Charles E. Sabel, A Constitution 
of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 328–89 (1998). 
 185.  Camacho, supra note 159, at 1415. 
 186.  See, e.g., Hillary M. Hoffmann, Climate Change and the Decline of the Federal Range: Is 
Adaptive Management the Solution?, 15 VT. J. ENV’T L. 262, 263 (2014); Joseph Arvai, Gavin 
Bridge, Nives Dolsak, Robert Franzese, Tomas Koontz, April Luginbuhl, Paul Robbins, Kenneth 
Richards, Katrina Smith Korfmacher, Brent Sohngen, James Tansey & Alexander Thompson, 
Adaptive Management of the Global Climate Problem: Bridging the Gap Between Climate Research 
and Climate Policy, 78 CLIMATIC CHANGE 217, 219 (2006); U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., RISING TO 
THE URGENT CHALLENGE: STRATEGIC PLAN FOR RESPONDING TO ACCELERATING CLIMATE CHANGE 
15–17 (2010), http://www.fws.gov/home/climatechange/pdf/CCStrategicPlan.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
D48B-GSDW]. 
 187.  See, e.g., HOLLY DOREMUS, WILLIAM L. ANDREEN, ALEJANDRO CAMACHO, DANIEL A. 
FARBER, ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, DALE GOBLE, BRADLEY C. KARKKAINEN, DANIEL ROHLF, A. DAN 
TARLOCK, SANDRA B. ZELLMER, SHANA JONES & YEE HUANG, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, 
MAKING GOOD USE OF ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT 5–9 (2011), https://cpr-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/ 
documents/Adaptive_Management_1104.pdf [https://perma.cc/PYJ5-5E9H] (noting that while 
“adaptive management is an important tool” in addressing environmental issues, when not used 
properly, “it can provide an excuse to delay politically uncomfortable decisions and to inhibit 
effective public oversight”); Craig & Ruhl, supra note 66, at 18–27. 
 188.  Gregg P. Macey, The Architecture of Ignorance, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1627, 1667 (2013) 
(discussing use of contingency planning to accommodate data gaps in environmental law). 
 189.  See 2 MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: 
SCENARIOS (Steve R. Carpenter, Prabhu L. Pingali, Elena M. Bennett & Monika B. Zurek eds., 
2005) (providing an analytical framework that offers tools for addressing ecosystem change 
through a series of “scenarios”). 
 190.  See Legal Adaptive Capacity, supra note 19, at 733. 
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was as part of the emphasis on developing more comprehensive, 
multispecies, multiagency habitat conservation planning.191 FWS 
regulations require contingency planning in HCPs for foreseeable 
changed circumstances,192 and the agency has long emphasized the 
value of adaptive implementation.193 In particular, they promote but 
rarely require use of adaptive management procedures.194 Moreover, 
the federal land agencies have adopted, to varying extents, the use of 
some form of adaptive management for at least some land management 
planning.195 But its use still remains limited in natural resources 
conservation,196 with the core procedural infrastructure of natural 
resources governance (including judicial review) suspicious of and even 
resistant to effective adaptive management.197 
It is perhaps unsurprising then that numerous scholars have 
documented the limitations of the attempted use of adaptive 
management in integrating provisionalism into natural resources 
governance. Some have pointed to how adaptive procedures are often 
elective198 and that public and private actors typically lack the 
resources or other incentives to engage in adaptive decisionmaking.199 
Others criticized agency invocation of adaptive management as little 
 
 191.  See Camacho, supra note 85, at 334; Cameron W. Barrows, Monica B. Swartz, Wendy L. 
Hodges, Michael F. Allen, John T. Rotenberry, Bai-Lian Li, Thomas A. Scott & Xiongwen Chen, A 
Framework for Monitoring Multiple-Species Conservation Plans, 69 J. WILDLIFE MGMT. 1333, 1334 
(2005); Marj Nelson, The Changing Face of HCPs, 18 ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE 4, 4–6 (2001) 
(describing HCPs that successfully integrated adaptive management). 
 192.  50 C.F.R. §§ 17.22(b)(5), 17.32(b)(5) (2019). 
 193.  See Camacho, supra note 85, at 329 (discussing the agency’s long-claimed “commitment 
to HCP adaptation during implementation”). 
 194.  See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., HABITAT 
CONSERVATION PLANNING AND INCIDENTAL TAKE PERMIT PROCESSING HANDBOOK 10-27 to 10-33 
(2016) (explaining adaptive management and the benefits of incorporating it into an HCP). 
 195.  See Legal Adaptive Capacity, supra note 19, at 757–58, 767, 781, 792–93, 803 (detailing 
adoption by various federal land agencies of adaptive management protocols for certain  
federal lands). 
 196.  See, e.g., Barrows et al., supra note 191, at 1335 (describing the limited use of adaptive 
management procedures in HCPs); Camacho, supra note 85, at 335. 
 197.  Craig & Ruhl, supra note 66, at 9–10. 
 198.  See Camacho, supra note 85, at 331. 
 199.  See R. Gregory, D. Ohlson & J. Arvai, Deconstructing Adaptive Management: Criteria for 
Applications to Environmental Management, 16 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 2411, 2413 (2006) 
(noting that a lack of institutional support can make applying adaptive management very 
difficult); J. Michael Scott, Brad Griffith, Robert S. Adamcik, Daniel M. Ashe, Brian Czech, Robert 
L. Fischman, Patrick Gonzalez, Joshua J. Lawler, A. David McGuire & Anna Pidgorna, National 
Wildlife Refuges, in PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF ADAPTATION OPTIONS FOR CLIMATE-SENSITIVE 
ECOSYSTEMS AND RESOURCES 5-1, 5-35 (Susan Herrod Julius & Jordan M. West eds., 2008) 
(discussing the legal, monetary, and administrative barriers that make it difficult to implement 
adaptive management strategies); Craig & Ruhl, supra note 66, at 12–13. 
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more than a catchphrase200 or, worse, as a method for enabling action 
while obscuring or deferring consideration of significant environmental 
risks.201 Though monitoring is usually required, it nonetheless remains 
inadequate even in adaptive management regimes.202 And although 
regular adjustment of provisional strategies is supposed to be a core 
trait of adaptive management, even well-regarded adaptive 
management experiments have not systematically integrated 
accumulated information to adjust management actions.203 
Yet the problem extends beyond the limitations of on-the-ground 
uses of adaptive management and other flexible decisionmaking 
protocols. As detailed in the next Part, public biodiversity governance 
is largely not well designed to manage procedural uncertainties at a 
large scale. This is because it suffers from the absence of an 
infrastructure for systematically monitoring, assessing, and  
adjusting public processes to promote learning and thus more  
adaptive governance.204 
IV. THE STRUCTURAL LIMITATIONS OF  
PUBLIC BIODIVERSITY GOVERNANCE 
Beyond the goals, tools, and processes of public biodiversity 
governance, the structure of governmental authority—to whom 
authority is allocated, and the relationship between such institutions—
considerably influences how well concerns about biodiversity are 
managed. Few wicked problems scholars, however, have focused on 
structural considerations, and those who have explored it have largely 
combined exploration of structural with procedural design.205 In the 
 
 200.  Craig & Ruhl, supra note 66, at 16. 
 201.  Legal Adaptive Capacity, supra note 19, at 737; see Craig & Ruhl, supra note 66, at 11. 
 202.  See Camacho, supra note 159, at 1416. Moreover, monitoring does not always include the 
collection of data about ambient conditions, provisional assumptions, and the effectiveness of 
adopted strategies. Id. at 1413–14. 
 203.  See, e.g., DOREMUS ET AL., supra note 187, at 11 (noting that “[o]ne of the most significant 
weaknesses” of adaptive management has been a failure of agencies to deliver on their promises 
of adaptation); J.B. Ruhl & Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95 MINN. L. 
REV. 424, 427, 461 (2010) (noting that courts “frequently are underwhelmed by how agencies 
implement adaptive management” in litigation over its use in resource management); Lawrence 
Susskind, Alejandro E. Camacho & Todd Schenk, Collaborative Planning and Adaptive 
Management in Glen Canyon: A Cautionary Tale, 35 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 1, 35–38 (2010) (detailing 
failures by Congress and agencies to adequately collect and incorporate stakeholder feedback in 
creating the Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program). 
 204.  Camacho,  supra note 159, at 1417; Camacho, supra note 182, at 64–76. 
 205.  See, e.g., Nancy Roberts, Wicked Problems and Network Approaches to Resolution, 1 INT’L 
PUB. MGMT. REV. 1, 2, 8 (2000) (highlighting tactics for distributing power among stakeholders); 
Lynelle Briggs, Tackling Wicked Problems: A Public Policy Perspective, AUSTL. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, 
https://www.apsc.gov.au/tackling-wicked-problems-public-policy-perspective (last updated June 
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context of biodiversity loss, for instance, one set of wicked problems 
scholars briefly recommend greater development of institutions in 
combination with “multidisciplinarity” and “taking personal 
responsibility.”206 Helpfully, Professors Ruhl and Salzman do explore 
how procedural strategies like predecision assessment, adaptive 
management, and cost-benefit analysis can be informed by theories 
such as dynamic federalism, new governance, and transgovernmental 
networks to help government institutions whittle away at massive 
problems.207 In this sense, they do consider how structural 
considerations can help manage wicked problems. But even their useful 
analysis and proposal for “ ‘weak ties’ networks” does not attempt to 
parse the various features and trade-offs of structural design.208 
More generally, scholars and policymakers have neglected the 
possibility of distinguishing between three distinctive dimensions of 
authority—namely, the extent authority is centralized, overlapped, and 
coordinated.209 Additionally, insufficient attention has been afforded to 
how the configuration of authority along these dimensions can, and 
often should be, altered for different governmental functions.210 Parsing 
the allocation of authority in each of these ways can clarify the trade-
offs of different allocations, allowing for authority to be tailored in ways 
that leverage the advantages and address the shortcomings of public 
biodiversity governance. 
As explained in this Part, public biodiversity governance is 
largely fragmented into many decentralized, at times overlapping, and 
relatively independent government institutions. There has been a 
proliferation of various formal and informal structures attempting to 
manage the relationship of these disparate authorities. Depending on 
the metric, some have been successful at helping link government 
management strategies over ecological resources. Others have 
inadvertently served as yet another layer of concurrent, but 
 
12, 2018) [https://perma.cc/J2AD-L68Z] (summarizing Roberts, supra, and suggesting sharing of 
problem-solving responsibility and information across government agencies and with 
nongovernmental entities); Michèle Morner & Manuel Misgeld, Governing Wicked Problems: The 
Role of Self-organizing Governance in Fostering the Problem-Solving Capabilities of Public Sector 
Organizations, ECPR 3–4 (2014), https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/f64cbbb5-3fed-4c50-
9b9b-da8fc498303b.pdf [https://perma.cc/3UND-KWHS] (noting the need for collaboration 
between public officials and citizens in resolving wicked problems).  
 206.  Sharman & Mlambo, supra note 8, at 276–77 (“The recent foundation of the 
Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform for Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) brings 
hope, because solutions to wicked problems are not technical or scientific but require institutional, 
political and philosophical engagements.”). 
 207.  Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 4, at 95–108. 
 208.  See id. at 108, 116–19. 
 209.  REORGANIZING GOVERNMENT, supra note 19, at 38–39. 
 210.  Id. at 21–30. 
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uncoordinated, authority. More fundamentally, much of public 
biodiversity governance still remains fragmented and ill-designed to 
manage large-scale shifts in conditions that are increasingly 
problematic for biodiversity conservation. 
A. A Baseline of Decentralized, Distinct Authority 
As alluded to earlier, there are many public institutions involved 
in managing or regulating actions affecting biodiversity conservation. 
Ecological resources are divided largely based on the type of land on 
which they are located, with the bulk of natural resource management 
in the United States on federal, state, and local public lands. Even just 
a focus on federal land management shows decentralized authority over 
different lands by the USFS, BLM, NPS, and FWS, among others.211 In 
addition, each state has at least one land agency that manages actions 
on its respective state-owned land.212 These lands are typically 
organized by type of land being managed or protected, and 
administering authorities have authority over the range of government 
functions over that particular land.213 Baseline management authority 
of ecological resources in this largely place-based patchwork is fairly 
decentralized, distinct, and independent, with each state or federal 
agency charged with relatively exclusive management of its 
jurisdictional lands.214 
B. Some Overlap and Limited Coordination 
There are a few important regulatory frameworks, however, that 
create overlap and some formal coordination of authority. The most 
notable are laws protecting or regulating a particular category of 
species, including endangered, wildlife, invasive, and agricultural 
species. As noted earlier, under the ESA, the FWS and NMFS215 
regulate private and public activity that might harm or jeopardize listed 
wildlife species.216 Their similarly decentralized authority overlaps with 
 
 211.  Id. at 33 n.6. 
 212.  See id. at 33. 
 213.  See, e.g., About the California State Lands Commission, CAL. ST. LANDS COMM’N, 
https://www.slc.ca.gov/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2020) [https://perma.cc/5LYY-33MC]; Our Agency’s 
History, CAL. NAT. RES. AGENCY, https://resources.ca.gov/About-Us/Our-Agencys-History (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2020) [https://perma.cc/9V8P-A828]. 
 214.  See, e.g., sources cited supra note 213.  
 215.  See supra note 81 and accompanying text (explaining the administration of the ESA 
through the FWS and NMFS). 
 216.  16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(a)(1), 1538(a)(2)(C).  
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those of the federal land agencies, as well as each other.217 Many states 
also have promulgated endangered species statutes that follow the 
general template of the federal ESA, though there are differences in the 
activities prohibited and allowed without a permit.218 This authority, 
administered by state wildlife agencies, overlaps with federal wildlife 
regulatory authority, as well as state and federal lands management.219 
These laws can also result in coordinated authority when an 
endangered species exists in resource areas under the jurisdiction of 
other agencies. Most notably, section 7 of the federal ESA expressly 
requires all federal agencies to coordinate with the NMFS (for marine 
species) or the FWS (for freshwater and wildlife species) when 
considering actions that might “jeopardize the continued existence” of 
listed endangered or threatened species or “result in the destruction or 
adverse modification of” their critical habitats.220 This coordination, 
which extends to agency planning, information generation, 
implementation, and postapproval monitoring,221 is quite in-depth and 
hierarchical.222 Action agencies are largely required to adopt Service 
recommendations and even abandon the action if the Service 
determines it is necessary to avoid jeopardy.223 The ESA also includes a 
number of less rigorous coordination mechanisms. For example, it 
requires the FWS to communicate with state authorities for 
determinations of the critical habitat for listed species.224 
A second avenue of interjurisdictional coordination is the 
assortment of federal and state laws that regulate invasive species, 
which create significant overlap and some interagency coordination. 
Various federal statutes regulate interstate invasive species 
movement.225 Executive Order 13,751, which restricts federal agency 
 
 217.  REORGANIZING GOVERNMENT, supra note 19, at 38–39; GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & 
ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW §§ 17, 29, 32 (2d ed. 2007). 
 218.  See Camacho, supra note 106, at 200 (giving specific examples of differences in  
state laws). 
 219.  See, e.g., Camacho et al., supra note 93, at 10838, 10841 (explaining that all states but 
one have endangered species laws and nearly one-third have private land use regulation). 
 220.  16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 
 221.  See REORGANIZING GOVERNMENT, supra note 19, at 113–14 (describing federal 
interagency coordination under the ESA). 
 222.  Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. 
L. REV. 1131, 1146 (2012). 
 223.  16 U.S.C. § 1536(b); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i) (2019); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154,  
169–70 (1997). 
 224.  16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 
 225. See, e.g., Lacey Act, 18 U.S.C. § 42 (banning shipment of injurious species); Plant 
Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7786 (targeting the shipment of plant pests); Animal Health 
Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8322 (authorizing the secretary of the treasury to ban any import 
containing any pest or disease of livestock). 
2–Camacho_PAGE.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/12/20  11:30 AM 
2020] PUBLIC GOVERNANCE & BIODIVERSITY 1621 
introductions of invasive species,226 establishes a National Invasive 
Species Council composed of thirteen federal agencies to help coordinate 
federal invasive species management.227 Some state invasive species 
laws require private and public parties to get permits for the 
importation and perhaps even in-state release228 of categories of flora 
and/or fauna,229 though some states provide exceptions for certain 
activities by state agencies.230 These invasive species laws thus create 
a patchwork of overlapping governance for the management of invasive 
species, at least on public lands. They also establish limited 
coordination through hierarchical permitting processes and venues  
for communication. 
Third, the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and 
state analogues establish ad hoc overlapping and coordinated authority 
over information generation and planning.231 NEPA requires federal 
agencies to prepare environmental impact statements disclosing the 
effects of and alternatives to any proposed “major Federal actions 
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”232 It also 
requires lead agencies to “consult with and obtain the comments of any 
Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with 
respect to any environmental impact involved.”233 Approximately half 
of the states have adopted analogous statutes applicable to state and 
local regulators.234 
Fourth, the federal government coordinates with state agencies 
through its funding authority. States receive funds through programs 
like the federal State Wildlife Grants Program and the Wildlife 
 
 226.  See Exec. Order No. 13,751, 81 Fed. Reg. 88,609, 88,611 (Dec. 8, 2016) (prohibiting 
federal agencies from introducing any invasive species unless it determines “the benefits of such 
actions clearly outweigh the potential harm caused by invasive species; and that all feasible and 
prudent measures to minimize risk of harm will be taken”). 
 227.  Id. at 88,610–11, 88,613 (requiring federal agencies to coordinate “to the extent 
practicable” with other agencies in performing their duties, and requiring the council to create a 
management plan for promoting “effective interagency coordination”). 
 228.  See, e.g., CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 3515 (West 2020); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-292 (2020); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-306 (2020). 
 229.  See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.921 (2020); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-306 (2020); IOWA 
CODE § 481A.47 (2020).  
 230.  For example, a few states grant agencies authority to propagate species necessary for 
stocking programs. See, e.g., CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 1007 (West 2020); IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 
13.01.03.100(01)(j) (2010). 
 231.  National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4375. 
 232.  See id. § 4332(2)(C). 
 233.  See id. 
 234.  See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing 
Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 905 n.7 (2002) (stating that 
over twenty-five states have emulated NEPA). 
2–Camacho_PAGE.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/12/20  11:30 AM 
1622 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:6:1585 
Conservation and Restoration Program if they adopt a wildlife action 
plan assessing the condition of a state’s wildlife and outlining necessary 
conservation actions.235 Consequently, the federal government does 
influence state wildlife and ecosystem planning through funding and 
coordination with states. 
In addition to these more formal forms of coordination, a wide 
assortment of ad hoc, voluntary, and/or less rigorous coordination 
arrangements have proliferated. Under the ESA, for instance, a number 
of local, state, and federal agencies have elected to contribute to 
multiagency HCP arrangements.236 These plans provide sustained 
opportunities for place-based, interjurisdictional coordination and 
collaboration throughout planning, permitting, implementation, and 
enforcement.237 But whether alternatively called councils, committees, 
task forces, commissions, or working groups, most coordination 
arrangements have taken the form of interjurisdictional networks for 
coordinating information gathering and planning between disparate 
authorities.238 Much coordination is extemporaneous, informal, and 
voluntary; it simply provides opportunities for increased 
communication between authorities rather than more rigorous 
coordination between public institutions.239 Moreover, coordination 
mechanisms are often focused on only a particular space or resource.240 
As a result, robust interjurisdictional coordination remains the 
exception and not the rule in biodiversity conservation, with most 
authority over natural resources still exercised fairly independently.241 
 
 235.  See 16 U.S.C. § 669c(e)(1). 
 236.  See Camacho, supra note 85, at 302–06 (noting that “the HCP program's agreement-
based approach to regulation” has been “instituted as a method for reinventing regulation to 
address widespread concerns regarding the ineffectiveness and adversarialism of existing 
decisionmaking processes” by encouraging meaningful participation by various stakeholders). 
 237.  Id.  
 238.  Camacho, supra note 182, at 29–30; Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 4, at 41–45 (discussing 
fora using “weak ties” to alleviate the effects of fragmentation). 
 239.  See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 222, at 1156 (describing considerable informal 
coordination between agencies); Camacho, supra note 182, at 30–36 (detailing the limited efficacy 
of place-based intergovernmental coordination mechanisms). 
 240.  See, e.g., Christensen et al., supra note 145, at 682 (arguing for coordination efforts to 
match the scale of a larger ecosystem); R. Edward Grumbine, What Is Ecosystem Management?, 8 
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 27 (1994) (advocating for a more holistic process because large-scale 
ecosystem management has not been “consistently applied by federal or state  
management agencies”). 
 241.  Camacho, supra note 182, at 26–28. 
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C. Trade-offs of Predominant Structure for Biodiversity Protection 
Though there are undoubted advantages to this cascading 
network of largely decentralized, somewhat distinct, and relatively 
independent authority, it is also not particularly well tethered for 
addressing many of the more conventional indirect stressors on 
biodiversity. The decentralization of authority allows for the 
development and application of particularized agency expertise, 
strategies that are tailored to diverse contexts, and opportunities for 
experimentation and cross jurisdictional learning by regulators.242 Such 
a framework works particularly well for managing fairly discrete, 
varied, and localized resources, as well as more direct biodiversity 
stressors such as proposed human encroachments. 
Decentralization, however, also has costs. In particular, a 
largely decentralized framework is not well equipped to address 
transboundary and cumulative harms.243 Of course, many of the 
stressors that lead to biodiversity loss, such as habitat fragmentation 
and invasive species, are paradigmatic examples of such harms. 
Decentralized authority can also lead to lack of uniformity,244 such as 
disparate treatment of species movement, which can either impede 
valuable migrations or fail to stem harmful ones.245  
And decentralization might forfeit administrative efficiencies  
from economies of scale available through a more  
centralized configuration.246 
Similarly, keeping authority distinct over different resources 
(such as public lands) raises trade-offs. On the one hand, it can 
minimize administrative or compliance costs.247 It can also help limit 
the risk of conflicting regulation.248 On the other hand, vesting 
authority exclusively means there is no regulatory safety net, 
increasing the risks of regulatory capture and under-regulation—
 
 242.  REORGANIZING GOVERNMENT, supra note 19, at 34. 
 243.  Id. at 36. 
 244.  Id. at 36–37. 
 245.  Camacho, supra note 159, at 1438–39. 
 246.  See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 
613–14 (1996) (stating that centralized efficiencies are more apparent in areas that are not “local-
information intensive”); Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1495, 1562–63 (1999) (explaining the information-sharing benefits of this approach); 
Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 
130, 148–49 (2005) (observing this phenomenon in a product-standards context). 
 247.  Freeman & Rossi, supra note 222, at 1150; Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and 
Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 214. 
 248.  See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 222, at 1150; Jason Marisam, Interagency 
Administration, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 183, 223 (2013) (noting how the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s (“EPA”) centralization helped unify Obama-era policy). 
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particularly concerning for biodiversity loss, with the potential for 
irreversible harm.249 A key advantage of ESA section 7—one of the few 
relatively hierarchical coordination mechanisms in public biodiversity 
governance—is precisely that it injects a safety net and anticapture 
safeguards into federal agency decisionmaking.250 
Likewise, there are advantages and disadvantages to relying on 
largely independent authority in public biodiversity governance. It can 
avoid administrative costs from coordination, reduce risks of 
government inaction, and promote arguably beneficial competition 
between government institutions.251 Yet lack of coordination is also 
more likely to lead to regulatory inconsistencies over resource 
management; inefficiencies due to the failure to pool expertise; risks of 
regulatory failure from agency shirking, mission drift, and free riding; 
and even a race to the bottom from intergovernmental competition,252 
such as between states over resource use and exploitation.253 
Indeed, much of the proliferation of place-based, ad hoc 
coordination in public biodiversity governance is likely induced by a 
desire to foster consistency and share resources and knowledge on 
specific environmental problems.254 But because they are often 
organized around particular issues or places, some of these coordination 
arrangements actually run the risk of merely adding another layer of 
governance, increasing regulatory costs without meaningfully 
addressing the disadvantages of decentralized and somewhat 
overlapping governance.255 As such, the baseline public biodiversity 
governance framework is not especially well designed to address 
conventional indirect stressors to biodiversity, such as invasive species 
and habitat fragmentation. 
D. Increased Overlap Through Climate Change 
Unfortunately, the existing regulatory structure is even less 
equipped for managing the alarming effects of climate change on 
 
 249.  See REORGANIZING GOVERNMENT, supra note 19, at 41–43. 
 250. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (providing rules for “interagency cooperation” in implementing the 
ESA); Jon Hasselman, Holes in the Endangered Species Act Safety Net: The Role of Agency 
“Discretion” in Section 7 Consultation, 25 STAN. ENV’T L.J. 125, 128–38 (2006) (providing an 
overview of the ESA’s history and arguing that “even agency actions that can be viewed as 
‘nondiscretionary’ are prohibited by § 7 if they will cause jeopardy”). 
 251.  REORGANIZING GOVERNMENT, supra note 19, at 46–48. 
 252.  Id. at 47–49. 
 253.  See, e.g., Noah D. Hall, Toward a New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Water 
Management in the Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 405, 453 (2006). 
 254.  E.g., POLLAK, supra note 148, at 6–7. 
 255.  Camacho, supra note 182, at 36, 48. 
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biodiversity. As stated earlier, climate change is compounding already 
significant pressures on biodiversity that are increasing risks of 
extinction.256 Rising temperatures will also cause changes in 
reproductive timing and behavior, timing of migration patterns, and 
shifts in habitat ranges northward and toward higher elevations that 
will “fundamentally rearrange U.S. ecosystems” and “alter ecosystem 
structure, function, and services, leading to predominantly negative 
consequences for biodiversity and the provision of ecosystem goods  
and services.”257 
Yet climate change is testing the resilience of the structure of 
public biodiversity governance in ways that are at least as troubling as 
these physical effects. The pressures of widespread changes in climatic 
conditions that are accelerating species movement also substantially 
increase jurisdictional overlap between the many decentralized 
government institutions charged with regulating and managing 
biodiversity loss. As wildlife and vegetation respond to altered climatic 
conditions over the next century, landscapes may no longer be suitable 
for preexisting flora and fauna long considered “native.”258 These 
species will have to emigrate elsewhere to survive, with many species 
facing extinction unless they can move considerable distances to adapt 
or their movement is actively facilitated.259 Relatedly, other—more 
compatible and very possibly non-native—immigrants will be needed to 
fill the niches vacated by those that emigrated.260 
Yet the largely segmented and uncoordinated authority that 
predominates public biodiversity governance was not designed to 
manage these widespread range shifts, contractions, and expansions of 
ecological resources that will blur the distinctions between legally 
 
 256.  The EPA determined years ago that “clear evidence” demonstrates “climate change is 
exerting major influences on natural environments and biodiversity, and these influences are 
generally expected to grow with increased warming.” Endangerment and Cause or Contribute 
Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 
66,534 (Dec. 15, 2009).  
 257.  Id. at 66,498. 
 258.  See Camacho, supra note 106, at 181–83 (describing the specific drivers and problems 
associated with newly uninhabitable conditions). 
 259.  See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 158, at 14–15; 
Thompson Webb III, Past Changes in Vegetation and Climate: Lessons for the Future, in GLOBAL 
WARMING AND BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 59, 60 (Robert L. Peters & Thomas E. Lovejoy ed., 1994) 
(discussing the loss of plant ranges due to climate change); O. Hoegh-Guldberg, L. Hughes, S. 
McLntyre, D. B. Lindenmayer, C. Parmesan, H. P. Possingham & C. D. Thomas, Assisted 
Colonization and Rapid Climate Change, 321 SCIENCE 345, 345 (2008). A leading but often-
contested article in Nature concluded that by 2050, up to two-thirds of species will need to migrate 
or be moved to new habitats to survive. Thomas et al., supra note 53, at 145. 
 260.  See Malcolm L. Hunter, Climate Change and Moving Species: Furthering the Debate on 
Assisted Colonization, 21 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1356, 1357 (2007). 
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discrete lands. Beyond the limitations of the existing substantive goals 
and strategies for biodiversity management identified in Part II, 
keeping authority predominantly decentralized, poorly coordinated, 
and increasingly overlapping will create substantial barriers to  
needed migrations. 
Climate change will make the difficulties in addressing 
transboundary concerns for decentralized authority increasingly 
prominent. And the additional overlap in authority due to the increased 
pressure for species migrations will substantially increase the potential 
for regulatory conflict. Species movement will be constrained not only 
by physical obstructions to dispersal, but also by management 
differences between jurisdictions. Vulnerable flora and fauna will need 
to move from one designated land category to another, but the 
management objectives of those new jurisdictions may hinder or bar 
such migration.261 Regulatory conflict is also likely to increase between 
these place-based laws of public lands and species-focused conservation 
laws, like those governing endangered and invasive species.262 The 
ESA, for example, might demand protections for migrating listed 
species that other public lands might categorize as invasive.263 Left 
unaddressed, the increased overlap paired with little or weak 
coordination is likely to exacerbate some of the preexisting limitations 
of public biodiversity governance. 
E. Limited Interjurisdictional Learning 
Unfortunately, public biodiversity governance is also weakened 
by the general absence of any infrastructure for promoting 
interjurisdictional learning and thus more adaptive governance.264 This 
structural concern builds on the procedural one identified in Part III 
regarding limited integration of adaptive decisionmaking. The focus 
here, however, is on the lack of a centralized or coordinated framework 
for generating, disseminating, or analyzing information about adopted 
management strategies. Natural resource laws typically do not require 
or otherwise promote the systematic generation of information about 
 
 261.  See Camacho, supra note 106, at 188 (describing the factors that determine the legality 
of assisted migration). 
 262.  For example, if a member of a listed endangered species attempts to migrate through 
designated wilderness outside its historical range, such movement arguably would be barred by 
the Wilderness Act. See id. at 198–99. It also might be considered invasive under federal or state 
invasive species laws. See id. at 199–201. 
 263.  For possible conflicting laws, see, for example, the Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701-
7786, the Lacey Act, 18 U.S.C. § 42, and the Alien Species Prevention and Enforcement Act, 39 
U.S.C. § 3015. 
 264.  Camacho, supra note 159, at 1417; Camacho, supra note 182, at 50. 
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the efficacy of programs and government institutions.265 While 
assessments by nongovernmental organizations may occasionally 
provide some relevant information, such analyses are not part of a 
legitimating public process of systematic monitoring, assessment, and 
adjustment.266 Nor is there any infrastructure for the broad 
dissemination of assessment data, even among partner institutions 
governing similar natural resources.267 
As a result, the capacity of public biodiversity governance to 
reduce uncertainty by learning about the effectiveness of past 
management actions is largely untapped. Existing decentralized and 
even distinct authority can be useful for providing avenues for 
experimentation, tailored strategies, and learning. But these 
opportunities for learning are wasted if there is no centralized or 
coordinated infrastructure for gathering and sharing such information 
more broadly. 
This deficiency is of particular concern in light of the various 
ways that climate change magnifies uncertainties for the management 
of ecological resources.268 In part, this is because climate change is 
bringing a wide range of changes, and often there is no readily available 
past analog on which resource managers can draw for making 
management decisions.269 There is significant uncertainty regarding 
the exact local effects and efficacy of possible management strategies in 
preventing or reducing the harmful effects of climate change. Climate 
change involves more complex and potentially confounding variables 
than most environmental issues, and localized modeling needed to aid 
adaptation decisions is improving but remains difficult.270 But this 
uncertainty is compounded because: (1) information about the 
performance of adopted strategies is rarely ever systematically 
 
 265.  See, e.g., Alejandro E. Camacho, Beyond Conjecture: Learning About Ecosystem 
Management from the Glen Canyon Dam Experiment, 8 NEV. L.J. 942, 955–56 (2008) (explaining 
the failure to implement a program to “monitor, evaluate, and adjust” the titular program over the 
last ten years). 
 266.  Cf. Camacho, supra note 85, at 343–44 (discussing how requiring governmental actors to 
systematically monitor and adapt programs not only provides vital information but also promotes 
accountability and legitimacy). 
 267.  See Bradley C. Karkkainen, “New Governance” in Legal Thought and in the World: Some 
Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471, 495 (2004) (describing the 
lack of “information-pooling” in HCPs); Karkkainen, supra note 234, at 946–48 (making reporting 
and transparency suggestions). 
 268.  Camacho, supra note 182, at 10–15. 
 269.  Id. at 13. 
 270.  See Camacho, supra note 159, at 1409–13. 
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generated, and (2) there are insufficient avenues for sharing 
information between existing regulatory authorities.271 
V. PROMOTING ADAPTIVE PUBLIC BIODIVERSITY GOVERNANCE 
Too often, even governance scholars who recognize the 
challenges raised by complex problems like biodiversity conflate the 
three key components of governance or only emphasize certain aspects 
to the detriment of others. Yet the strategies, processes, and structures 
of governance can and should be reshaped to better resist and manage 
biodiversity loss. 
A. Goals and Strategies to Advance Biodiversity 
1. Prioritizing Ecological Health 
Substantive conservation management can be reshaped to 
better promote biodiversity in a changing world. Rather than tethering 
biodiversity law to the preservation, restoration, wildness, or 
consumptive goals that predominate natural resources law, climate 
change necessitates managing ecological resources to more directly 
promote biodiversity.272 This certainly does not mean that cultural 
conservation goals such as historical and wildness preservation, or 
more consumptive goals such as sustained yield, must be categorically 
discarded. But their emphasis will be increasingly costly to biodiversity 
should they remain a greater priority. For biodiversity loss to 
decelerate, if not be reversed, the substantial portfolio in the United 
States of reserved public lands and regulated ecological resources needs 
to be reinvested more substantially in promoting ecological health. A 
number of scholars have in fact sought to reframe restoration and 
preservation to be less tethered to historical fidelity and more focused 
on restoring ecological health or function.273 
Of course, a shift toward prioritizing biodiversity and away from 
conventional restoration, historical preservation, wildness 
 
 271.  See id. at 1415–20. 
 272.  See Bruce A. Stein, Amanda Staudt, Molly S. Cross, Natalie S. Dubois, Carolyn Enquist, 
Roger Griffis, Lara J. Hansen, Jessica J. Hellmann, Joshua J. Lawler, Erik J. Nelson & Amber 
Pairis, Preparing for and Managing Change: Climate Adaptation for Biodiversity and Ecosystems, 
11 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENV’T 502, 505 (2013) (arguing for a more proactive and forward-looking 
approach to ecological support). 
 273.  Cf. Stephen T. Jackson & Richard J. Hobbs, Ecological Restoration in Light of Ecological 
History, 325 SCIENCE 567, 567–68 (2009) (emphasizing the value of “predisturbance restoration 
targets,” but nonetheless asserting that “[e]cological restoration finds new moorings in 
emphasizing restoration of ecosystem function, goods, and services”); Alyson C. Flournoy, 
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preservation, or sustained yield is no more than the initial judgment. 
As I have suggested before, ecological conservation might be framed 
broadly to promote some notion of future ecosystem function, health, or 
“quality.”274 This might include biodiversity conservation, but also could 
be understood as promoting the productivity of a particular favored 
resource or set of resources.275 It might be realized as maximizing 
aggregate biomass, though even so there might be various different 
metrics for measuring such an objective.276 
Defining, measuring, and advancing biodiversity alone as a goal 
is also fraught.277 Measures of biodiversity commonly refer to richness 
(number of unique life forms), evenness (equitability among life forms), 
and heterogeneity (dissimilarity among life forms),278 but these are 
overlapping concepts.279 If and how they should be aggregated remains 
unsettled,280 with scholars offering numerous metrics for biodiversity281 
and its conservation.282 Management strategies also might focus on 
genetic, population, species, assemblage, or ecosystem diversity, or 
 
Restoration Rx: An Evaluation and Prescription, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 187, 195–96 (2000) (“[S]uccessful 
restoration must focus on the functioning of the system as a whole . . . . This dictates a focus on 
processes, not endpoints, and on systems, not individual organisms or species.”). See generally Dan 
Tarlock, Slouching Toward Eden: The Eco-Pragmatic Challenges of Eco-Revival, 87 MINN. L. REV. 
1173 (2003) (pointing out flaws in an ecological approach that is backwards-looking and concerned 
with preserving a status quo). 
 274.  See, e.g., Camacho, supra note 25, at 555–56. 
 275.  See, e.g., Casey P. TerHorst & Pablo Munguia, Measuring Ecosystem Function: 
Consequences Arising from Variation in Biomass-Productivity Relationships, 9 CMTY. ECOLOGY 39, 
39 (2008) (explaining that productivity is one important measure of ecosystem function and that 
the current operational definition of net productivity is biomass produced per unit of time). 
 276.  Id. (describing a variety of measures to estimate productivity, including annual rainfall, 
oxygen measurements, standing biomass, and changes in biomass). 
 277.  See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 278.  Cardinale et al., supra note 7, at 60. 
 279.  Andy Purvis & Andy Hector, Getting the Measure of Biodiversity, 405 NATURE 212,  
213 (2000). 
 280.  Id. at 218 (“[B]iodiversity cannot be reduced to a single number . . . . We must of course 
recognize — and explain to policy-makers — that combining these dimensions into a single number 
would be arbitrary.”). 
 281.  See, e.g., Matt Davis, Søren Faurby & Jens-Christian Svenning, Mammal Diversity Will 
Take Millions of Years to Recover from the Current Biodiversity Crisis, 115 PNAS 11262, 11262 
(2016) (asserting that phylogenetic diversity is a better metric of biodiversity than species richness 
or functional diversity); Tom Leinster & Mark W. Meckes, Maximizing Diversity in Biology and 
Beyond, 18 ENTROPY 88 (2016) (advocating for an entropy-based approach); Charles W. Fowler, 
Maximizing Biodiversity, Information, and Sustainability, 17 BIODIVERSITY & CONSERVATION 841 
(2008) (using the Shannon-Weiner information index to calculate the anthropogenic effects  
on  biodiversity). 
 282.  See, e.g., Faith, supra note 33 (describing “safe minimum standard” for biodiversity as 
an alternative to triage). 
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some segment or combination thereof.283 And of course different 
strategies might be directed at different concerns. Accordingly, which 
particular manifestation of biodiversity conservation is adopted, and 
how such a goal is measured and operationalized, will play an incredibly 
significant role in the management strategies adopted—and, in the 
context of global climate change, which species movements are allowed, 
or even assisted.284 
As I have also argued elsewhere, a focus on promoting or 
prioritizing particular ecological processes in an ecosystem may provide 
more concrete components to center on once the tether to promoting 
native and restricting non-native is no longer available.285 A fertile and 
growing ecosystem services literature emphasizes identifying and 
measuring the beneficial services of ecosystems.286 These include 
provisioning services (such as production of food and water), regulating 
services that help control climate and disease, supporting services that 
cycle nutrients and produce, and cultural services like recreational or 
spiritual benefits.287 
But even so, the measurement and prioritization of these various 
different services for any particular landscape or ecosystem is value-
laden and contestable.288 Public biodiversity governance and associated 
academic disciplines (such as environmental ethics, economics, ecology, 
and conservation biology) must accelerate and deepen the investigation 
and discussion of how to measure and reconcile these many values and 
trade-offs. A shift to a greater emphasis on promoting biodiversity and 
ecological health is a necessary first step that would greatly facilitate 
such examinations and debates. 
 
 283.  See Michael E. Soulé, Conservation: Tactics for a Constant Crisis, 253 SCIENCE 744,  
744 (1991). 
 284.  See Faith, supra note 33 (“[T]he choice among these different biodiversity ‘models’ will 
depend on what values are important to the decision-maker.”). 
 285.  Camacho, supra note 25, at 564; cf. Faith, supra note 33 (describing how a focus on 
valuing ecosystem processes arguably promotes maintenance and evolution of ecosystems  
and biodiversity). 
 286.  See, e.g., Christian Layke, Measuring Nature’s Benefits: A Preliminary Roadmap for 
Improving Ecosystem Service Indicators 3 (Sept. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), https://files. 
wri.org/s3fs-public/pdf/measuring_natures_benefits.pdf [https://perma.cc/2F4W-BP9Y]; CLAIRE 
BROWN, ABISHA MAPENDEMBE, LISA INGWALL KING & JEANNE L. NEL, U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME 
WORLD CONSERVATION MONITORING CTR., MEASURING ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: GUIDANCE ON 
DEVELOPING ECOSYSTEM SERVICE INDICATORS (2014).  
 287.  See, e.g., MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: 
SYNTHESIS, at vi (2005), https://www.millenniumassessment.org/documents/document.356. 
aspx.pdf [https://perma.cc/VD5X-48BX].  
 288.  See Faith, supra note 33 (contrasting those arguing for valuation metrics with those 
claiming it is “doomed to failure” (quoting BRYAN G. NORTON, THE PRESERVATION OF SPECIES  
202 (1986)). 
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2. A Rigorous and Active Toolkit 
Whichever manifestations of ecological health are adopted, a 
reorientation toward more directly promoting biodiversity in natural 
resources management would likely require a pervasive transition 
away from primarily reactive and retrospective strategies toward 
incorporation of more diverse and active interventions tethered to some 
form of ecological health in light of future climatic conditions. 
Promoting future ecological health in public lands planning and 
management likely would include, depending on the land management 
regime, a de-emphasis on maximizing consumptive use, preserving or 
restoring preexisting assemblages of species, and minimizing human 
intervention.289 Invasive species laws might curtail categorical 
resistance to human introductions and non-native movement (while 
allowing any native movement) and make the central inquiry whether 
a particular movement is expected to aid or detract from  
ecological health.290 
The ESA and other species management laws should continue 
but go further than the recent shift from permit-by-permit regulatory 
hooks to more purposefully manage cumulative and indirect stressors, 
such as invasive species or habitat fragmentation. Multispecies, 
ecosystem-based, and landscape-level planning291 might provide 
increased opportunities for addressing biodiversity loss beyond species 
extinction, such as ecological vulnerabilities to non-endangered species 
or habitat. Moreover, ESA recovery plans could be adequately funded 
and enforceable,292 as well as address broader ecological health 
concerns (such as biodiversity loss to non-listed species or ecological 
functions not linked to listed species). But wildlife management could 
go beyond trying to preserve preexisting biotic assemblages to manage 
ecological change and transition areas to protect if not enhance 
ecological health.293 This likely would need to include a much broader 
portfolio of passive strategies than reserved lands or even  
wildlife corridors. 
 
 289.  See Legal Adaptive Capacity, supra note 19, at 717–20. 
 290.  See Camacho, supra note 87, at 900. 
 291.  See supra notes 144–146 and accompanying text. 
 292.  See, e.g., Justin Berchiolli, Stewarding Species: How the Endangered Species Act Must 
Improve, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1079, 1081–83, 1085 (2020) (“Even if policymakers were to adopt 
regulations promoting and overseeing species recovery, increasing the regulatory 
burden . . . without equally increasing [the] funding may not translate to . . . progress.”). 
 293.  See Camacho, supra note 106, at 228, 234, 244 (advocating for wildlife management 
strategies that seek to not only protect and restore pre-existing biota but also to facilitate new 
biotic development). 
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Providing private incentives to promote biodiversity beyond 
financial subsidies may also be critical. Some scholars have called for 
substantially more attention to the management of private property 
and landscapes and waterways between protected areas—the “matrix 
lands”—to increase their permeability.294 For example, forests might be 
managed in ways that leave higher densities of trees standing.295 
Agricultural lands might be required or incentivized to maintain soft 
borders (such as windbreaks, shelter belts, and filter strips) or 
otherwise provide avenues for species movement or transition to 
agroecological uses.296 Freshwater and coastal land management might 
remove subsidies that spur connectivity-reducing development, restore 
natural floodplains, or remove impassable culverts to allow for easier 
movement of fish.297 And land development might be regulated or 
incentivized to reduce wildlife impacts, such as through the use of 
preferred plants, fencing, or wildlife over- and underpasses.298 The 
challenge with this suite of strategies will be increasing the 
permeability of lands in ways that promote valuable species movement 
but also impede those movements likely to harm biodiversity. 
But promoting biodiversity conservation in a world of landscape-
scale climatic changes might also require increased reliance on more 
active, interventionist strategies in some contexts.299 These might 
include assisted migration and translocation outside of existing ranges 
to overcome large-scale dispersal barriers in light of anticipated 
climatic conditions,300 and even perhaps build on past strategies, such 
as captive breeding, to integrate biotechnological approaches.301 But it 
is clear that the goals and strategies of conservation law can and should 
be shaped to better advance biodiversity in a changing world. 
B. Adaptive Processes with Presumptions of Nativity 
Effective biodiversity governance also requires the integration 
into regulatory processes of standards that facilitate species movement 
and even introductions that are favorable to ecological health, while 
limiting (if not eliminating) those migrations or translocations that are 
not. In my view, this means typically rejecting essentialist 
 
 294.  Kostyack et al., supra note 144, at 714. 
 295.  Id.  
 296.  Id. at 715. 
 297.  Id.  
 298.  Id. at 716. 
 299.  Camacho, supra note 106, at 247. 
 300.  See id. at 233–34.  
 301.  See Camacho, supra note 87. 
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classifications that categorically protect movements if an organism pre-
existed, or because it is moving without direct human assistance.302 
Similarly, both active introductions and movement of species outside 
their historical range should not be entirely barred.303 
Instead, public biodiversity governance processes should rely on 
cautious risk assessments of the trade-offs of species movements.304 
These might be in conjunction with rebuttable presumptions, such as 
that the movement of an ecological unit is appropriate in locations 
where it already exists or existed.305 Likewise, there might be a 
presumption—but not a bar—against immigration or intentional 
translocations to areas outside a species’ historical or current range.306 
With or without default presumptions, adoption of 
particularized risk assessments for species movements must be paired 
with more adaptive decisionmaking. Just as the rigidity of public 
biodiversity governance is well trodden in the literature on adaptive 
management and governance, so are the general attributes of essential 
changes. Many have suggested the need for integrating resilience and 
adaptability in decisionmaking to manage the variability and 
uncertainty of biodiversity loss through greater reliance on techniques 
like adaptive management. These allow not only provisional decisions 
based on existing information, but also incremental policy and decision 
adjustments at the back end if conditions warrant.307 As adaptive 
management may not be appropriate or feasible in all circumstances, 
less rigorous alternatives such as contingency planning can incentivize 
iterative planning and periodic adjustments and thus increase 
procedural adaptive capacity.308 
Instigating adaptive processes not only at the project level but 
more programmatically is crucial, however.309 In my view, effective 
adaptive procedural governance requires not only empiricism and 
experimentalism in implementing on-the-ground conservation 
strategies. It also necessitates more systematic monitoring, 
 
 302.  Id. 
 303.  See Camacho, supra note 106, at 200 (giving state law examples for potential non-native 
introduction rules). 
 304.  Camacho, supra note 87, at 897–902. 
 305.  Id. at 902–05. 
 306.  Id. at 903. 
 307.  See, e.g., Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 203, at 429 (stating that the adaptive 
management framework relies on “iterative cycles of goal determination, model building, 
performance standard setting, outcome monitoring, and standard recalibration . . . .”). 
 308.  See, e.g., Macey, supra note 188, at 1667 (discussing use of contingency planning to 
accommodate data gaps in environmental law). 
 309.  See, e.g., Camacho, supra note 85, at 342. 
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assessment, and adjustment of agency policies, programs, and  
even processes.310 
C. Coordinated Learning by Distinguishing Functional Authority 
Both the wicked problems and adaptive management 
literatures, however, have overlooked that the allocation of authority in 
public biodiversity governance also can and should be transformed, 
oriented more toward managing both conventional and emerging 
indirect cumulative stressors on biodiversity. Many have pointed out 
that the fragmentation of authority in biodiversity management 
impedes its success.311 Those who consider it, however, too often 
conflate different components of structural authority. 
1. Disaggregating Public Governance 
The allocation of authority among institutions can and should be 
disaggregated. As Professor Robert Glicksman and I have argued in a 
range of contexts, policymakers need to distinguish between three 
different dimensions of authority: the extent authority is centralized or 
decentralized, the extent to which authority overlaps between different 
institutions or is distinct, and the extent to which authority is 
coordinated or independent.312 As illustrated in Part IV, each of these 
dimensions raises a range of trade-offs.313 
Moreover, in both allocating authority and assessing the trade-
offs of doing so, policymakers should differentiate between the range of 
implicated government functions—funding, data generation, 
information compilation and distribution, information analysis, 
planning, standard setting, implementation and permitting, inspection 
and compliance monitoring, and enforcement.314 For example, the 
trade-offs of centralizing information dissemination are different than 
 
 310.  Camacho, supra note 182, at 76. 
 311.  See, e.g., Gregory N. Mandel, Gaps, Inexperience, Inconsistencies, and Overlaps: Crisis in 
the Regulation of Genetically Modified Plants and Animals, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2167, 2231–
42 (2004) (discussing the coordinated framework’s regulatory gaps, inconsistencies, inexperience, 
and duplication); PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD & BIOTECHNOLOGY, ISSUES IN THE REGULATION OF 
GENETICALLY ENGINEERED PLANTS & ANIMALS 10–13, 18 (2004), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/ 
media/legacy/uploadedfiles/phg/content_level_pages/reports/foodbiotechregulation0404pdf.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZF9P-TYDQ] (discussing the coordinated framework’s issues of legal 
uncertainty, regulatory gaps, inconsistency, and lack of coordination). 
 312.  REORGANIZING GOVERNMENT, supra note 19, at 35–49. 
 313.  See supra Section IV.C. 
 314.  See REORGANIZING GOVERNMENT, supra note 19, at 56–57 (discussing which functions 
are better fits for certain organizational structures and how that can change over time). 
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those for permitting.315 Similarly, overlapping authority in enforcement 
can be paired with more distinct or even exclusive authority for 
standard setting.316 And different forms or degrees of interagency 
coordination may be employed for planning and permitting.317 As 
illustrated below, attending to these distinctions can help policymakers 
adjust public biodiversity governance to better accomplish regulatory 
goals, including allocating authority to institutions in ways that 
manage and reduce uncertainty and promote learning. 
2. Reorienting Public Biodiversity Institutions 
Any coherent effort to manage wildlife movement to limit 
extinction and maintain ecosystem productivity and biodiversity is 
likely to require tailored but vital alterations to public biodiversity 
governance’s baseline of decentralized, increasingly overlapping, but, at 
best, weakly coordinated authority. Introducing different forms of 
coordination for certain functions can help promote intergovernmental 
learning and address other structural limitations of public biodiversity 
governance. Moreover, judicious increases in centralization for funding 
and even standard setting on migration and introduction strategies 
help tackle concerns about transboundary harms, promote 
harmonization, and leverage economies of scale. Yet it also maintains 
the expertise, diversity, and experimentation advantages of still 
primarily decentralized authority. 
a. Tailored Coordination and Centralization 
Instituting forms of coordination over information dissemination 
and generation, planning, and implementation—paired with more 
centralized financing and standard setting over wildlife movement—
could help address concerns regarding lack of harmonization and 
transboundary harms exacerbated by climate change. First, to deal 
with the considerable uncertainty about the effects of climate change 
and effectiveness of potential management strategies, there is a 
credible argument that the federal government should develop a 
framework of hierarchically coordinated information dissemination on 
ecological resources. To truly promote interjurisdictional learning on 
resource management, such a clearinghouse would have to include not 
only scientific information about ecological effects, but also systematic 
 
 315.  Id. at 66. 
 316.  Id. at 98–100. 
 317.  See id. at 120–23 (“Varying the extent of coordination among functions should heighten 
the advantages of coordination while minimizing its disadvantages.”). 
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reports on the past performance of management strategies.318 As 
information generation would be undertaken by those entities adopting 
and implementing management strategies, policymakers would need to 
oblige resource agencies to regularly monitor, assess, and adjust 
adopted management strategies based on their performance in light of 
regulatory goals and targets. 
In addition, coordination of biodiversity planning and 
implementation would help reconcile the increased conflict among 
ecological resource management authorities from the migration effects 
of climate change. Increased reliance on mechanisms akin to some 
already used in natural resources law might help manage the increased 
intersection of authority due to species movement. NEPA and its state 
analogs will continue to provide opportunities for horizontal 
coordination of information generation and planning on the effects and 
alternatives to proposed federal management of ecosystems. 
Policymakers might even borrow from the ESA’s allocation of authority 
and adjust such laws to require more hierarchical coordination of 
implementation as well.319 NEPA and its progeny, however, only 
contemplate coordination in the context of declared governmental 
actions.320 In contrast, the fundamental question in managing the 
effects of climate change on biodiversity is not how a proposed human 
action may affect the environment, but rather how to manage the 
indirect effects of climate change on species movement and biodiversity. 
As such, proactive biodiversity conservation may necessitate 
governmental planning in contexts in which direct human action has 
not been proposed.321 A weaker, more horizontally coordinated approach 
might be a collaborative infrastructure that brings resource 
management authorities together to engage in broader biodiversity 
planning.322 But interjurisdictional planning could be adapted to 
require more rigorous coordination, such as required harmonization of 
 
 318.  See Camacho, supra note 182, at 66. 
 319.  See REORGANIZING GOVERNMENT, supra note 19, at 100–23. 
 320.  Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 399 (1976). See also Daniel A. Farber, Adaptation 
Planning and Climate Impact Assessments: Learning from NEPA’s Flaws, 39 ENV’T L. REP. NEWS 
& ANALYSIS 10605, 10608 (2009) (detailing the process by which the acting agency must consult 
environmental agencies with specific expertise). 
 321.  See Farber, supra note 320, at 10607 (explaining how climate change flips the 
reorientation of planning away from the conventional focus on how proposed human actions affect 
the environment and toward how the environment may affect humans). 
 322.  For example, the now-defunct Federal Interagency Adaptation Task Force was a modest 
step toward interagency climate adaptation coordination. Exec. Order No. 13,653, 78 Fed. Reg. 
66,819 (Nov. 1, 2013) (revoked by Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 28, 2017)). 
However, it was almost entirely federal and not designed to prioritize goals or manage interagency 
conflict, but largely for communication only. See id. at 66,819–23. 
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strategies or charging a single institution with final approval. For 
implementation, a more hierarchical coordination model might be ESA 
section 7’s interagency consultation requirement,323 modified to require 
consultation with federal wildlife agencies not only on endangered 
species but also other categories of migrating ecological resources such 
as invasive and other major migrating species. 
A more centralized approach, with potential transboundary cost 
internalization advantages, might involve the establishment and 
prioritization of federal ecological management standards and 
priorities related to migrating ecological resources. Similarly, 
centralizing at the federal level the bulk of financing for migration or 
translocation efforts might make sense. This might both take 
advantage of the federal government’s superior capacity to pool funding 
and provide a conduit for coordinating planning requirements and 
standards with state resource managers. 
Combining centralized standard setting and financing with 
differentially coordinated systems of information generation, 
dissemination, and planning could serve to proliferate opportunities for 
information sharing and cultivate learning. This, in turn, should help 
reduce the barriers to regulation exacerbated by uncertainty. 
Furthermore, providing a transparent means for assessing agency 
progress toward regulatory goals would help promote more effective 
agency decisionmaking and regulator accountability.324 It should also 
promote benefits in increased connectivity between lands through more 
coordinated planning and standard setting. 
b. Continued Decentralized Baseline 
There are strong arguments for retaining decentralized control 
of some functions as well, such as implementation of specific 
conservation strategies with state and federal resource agencies. 
Decentralized authority would allow for a range of management 
strategies in implementation, which would facilitate the development 
of specialized approaches tailored to local variations and resource-
specific circumstances. Furthermore, maintaining decentralized 
implementation would continue to provide opportunities for regulatory 
experimentation. To promote such management customization and 
experimentation, the choice of concrete management strategies related 
 
 323.  16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 
 324.  See Camacho, supra note 182, at 65–70 (discussing how a publicly accessible 
clearinghouse would increase intergovernmental information sharing).  
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to wildlife movement should likely remain with each agency delegated 
authority over a particular land or resource. 
Such decentralized implementation would serve to reduce 
uncertainty when accompanied with the broader coordinated system of 
information sharing. Requiring horizontal coordination of information 
generation and dissemination, and hierarchically coordinated (or even 
centralized) standard setting, accommodates the core experimentation 
benefits of decentralized governance by allowing jurisdictions to learn 
from the experiences of other regulatory authorities. The existence of 
many different regulatory authorities provides considerable 
opportunities for experimentation and interjurisdictional learning.325 
In conjunction with pressuring regulators to learn through mandated 
planning, providing resource managers access to such information and 
communication will help promote the potential customization and 
experimentation benefits of decentralized authority. Because such an 
approach neither requires agency consolidation nor agreement on a 
particular management strategy, making such information broadly 
available is valuable whether agencies engage in collaborative efforts 
or act independently in exercising their implementation and 
enforcement functions.326 
c. Judicious Overlap with Division of Primacy 
Finally, though there are likely to be considerable benefits from 
maintaining overlapping authority over transboundary ecological 
movement for some governmental functions, there will also be 
opportunities to minimize inefficiencies for duplication over other 
functions. In light of the increase in interaction among jurisdictions and 
the substantial uncertainty that accompanies climate change, 
identifying a single regulatory scale for managing ecological resources 
will remain difficult. A model of overlapping authority, with its greater 
safety net advantages (albeit with likely greater inefficiencies), would 
be particularly valuable for minimizing risks of irreversible harm to 
 
 325.  Adler, supra note 246, at 137. 
 326.  See William W. Buzbee, The Regulatory Fragmentation Continuum, Westway and the 
Challenges of Regional Growth, 21 J.L. & POL. 323, 353 (2005) (“Even if inter-jurisdictional 
competition is viewed as a good, one can embrace allocation of such information-gathering 
functions to federal actors.”).  
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biodiversity.327 This might especially be the case for functions such as 
planning and enforcement.328 
Integrating hierarchical coordination mechanisms between 
authorities, however, can help manage some of the potential risks of 
inaction from overlap. For example, empowering an agency (such as the 
FWS) with the authority to assess and authorize strategies proposed by 
others—both measures for promoting beneficial species, such as 
introductions, as well as restrictive management measures proposed to 
manage detrimental species—can help ensure overlap does not overly 
restrict ecologically valuable movements. 
Moreover, though some overlap of authority may have benefits, 
this does not mean that authority cannot be lodged primarily or even 
exclusively to one institution for certain actions or functions. For 
example, though it might make sense to allow the FWS, state wildlife 
agency, and state land manager to be involved in endangered species 
migration on state land, many of the safety net benefits of overlapping 
authority might be reaped by overlap of only a few functions. All three 
might participate in the information generation and planning process; 
the FWS might be charged primarily with information dissemination, 
financing, and standard setting; and information analysis and 
implementation could be lodged in the state land management agency. 
In short, though overlapping regulatory authority coalesced around 
particular substantive areas may make sense for ecological resources, 
such jurisdictional redundancy may be better focused on certain 
governmental functions rather than perfunctory and full duplication for 
every function. 
CONCLUSION 
For decades, scholars and policymakers have dedicated 
considerable time to understanding and attempting to manage 
incredibly complex problems. This literature has spawned a variety of 
labels for these great challenges, with some outlining detailed 
approaches for characterizing them. And though some seem to accept 
inevitable defeat in addressing these issues, others have offered 
frameworks for tackling them. Virtually all, however, have focused 
primarily on the possible development of procedural mechanisms, with 
 
 327.  See Camacho, supra note 182, at 66–68 (discussing the benefits of intergovernmental 
information gathering on climate change); Ruhl, supra note 20, at 1400–02 (touting the benefits of 
overlapping redundancy of “dynamic federalism” with regards to climate change). 
 328.  See REORGANIZING GOVERNMENT, supra note 19, at 99–100. 
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few actually distinguishing process from the substantive and structural 
aspects of governmental authority. 
Yet, at least in the context of addressing biodiversity loss, 
attending to substantive and structural legal adaptive capacity, in 
addition to procedural adaptive capacity, is critical. In particular, public 
biodiversity governance processes must evolve to be more adaptive; it is 
at least as important that policymakers integrate more substantive 
legal adaptive capacity into public institutions. Express integration of 
ecological health as a core objective of public lands, endangered species, 
and invasive species laws is a start, but it also necessitates the 
proliferation of more flexible and interventionist strategies such as 
translocations and cultivating land permeability that seek to more 
actively manage ecological change. 
Similarly, policymakers also must consider the role of structural 
legal adaptive capacity. Varying the extent of centralization, overlap, 
and coordination by the government function at issue can better 
leverage the advantages of different dimensions of authority while 
minimizing weaknesses. In the context of public biodiversity 
governance, adjustments to predominantly decentralized, overlapping, 
and weakly coordinated authority are necessary to manage growing 
transboundary risks, reduce harmful anticipated regulatory conflict, 
and promote intergovernmental learning. Tailored increases in 
coordination for information generation, dissemination, planning, and 
implementation—combined with centralization of standard setting and 
financing—might effectively address these concerns while retaining the 
expertise, diversity, and experimentation advantages of still primarily 
decentralized authority of implementation. Similarly, allocating 
overlapping authority for planning and enforcement, but more distinct 
authority to centralized and decentralized authorities (such as standard 
setting and implementation, respectively), can provide a valuable safety 
net for biodiversity while minimizing wasteful duplication. 
Of course, these suggested reallocations are merely preliminary 
possibilities. As there is at best limited information gathered about the 
efficacy of different substantive strategies, procedures, and allocations 
of authority, perhaps as important as the adjustment of substantive, 
procedural, and structural authority is the institution of an adaptive 
governance infrastructure that builds such assessments into public 
biodiversity governance.329 More procedural and structural adaptive 
governance, which integrates such analyses systematically into the 
regulatory process itself, is essential. While calls for adaptive 
governance have primarily sought to build systematic empirical 
 
 329.  Id. at 235. 
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evaluation of substantive and procedural strategies into regulatory 
decisionmaking, more adaptive structural governance would embed the 
analysis of the best ways to structure government—a learning 
infrastructure—into the administrative state as well.330 To more 
effectively tackle biodiversity loss and other complex problems—indeed, 
to whittle away at the wicked problem of good public governance—
scholars and policymakers must try to reconstruct governance to build 
capacities to learn from successful and unsuccessful ventures, using the 
resulting insights to engender further reforms. 
 
 
 330.  Id. at 236. 
